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JURISDICTION AND MERITS
Howard M. Wasserman*
Abstract: Federal courts frequently err by treating factual elements of substantive federal
causes of action as going to the jurisdiction of the federal court. This arises most frequently
as to elements in three federal causes of action: the quantum-of-employees element in
employment discrimination claims, the "affecting commerce" element under the Sherman
Act, and the state action requirement in constitutional actions. Courts treat the failure of one
of these elements as a basis for dismissing an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
rather than for failure to state a claim on the merits. The error in this characterization affects
the time and manner in which issues are adjudicated and resolved within the litigation
process, as well as the positivist imperative of treating distinct legal conceptions in a distinct
manner. This Article argues for a plain-language, positive-law approach to the separation of
jurisdiction and merits. A court determines its subject-matter jurisdiction by examining the
language of the jurisdiction-granting statute, the statute enacted pursuant to Congress's
structural power and empowering the court to hear and resolve civil actions. All facts that
may come into play in the case are relevant solely to the underlying substantive cause of
action and to whether the plaintiff has established a violation of rights entitling her to judicial
relief. These facts, if disputed, await resolution at trial on the merits.
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INTRODUCTION
An African-American woman files a civil action in federal district
court alleging that she was fired because of her race and sex, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The defendant files a
motion to dismiss the action, arguing that it is not an employer within
the meaning of Title VII. The statute defines an employer as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day" over a particular period of time.2 The
defendant's motion creates a factual dispute: the complaint includes an
allegation that the defendant has at least fifteen employees and thus is an
employer within the meaning of Title VII, while the defendant now
asserts the opposite.
This is where courts risk conflating the distinct concepts of
jurisdiction and merits. In order to resolve the defendant's motion, the
court must characterize the motion and the underlying issue of fact. The
motion could be one to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 3
and the fact characterized as jurisdictional, in that the failure of the fact
deprives the court of the basic power or authority to entertain the action
or to resolve the dispute between the parties. 4 Alternatively, the motion
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (making it unlawful employment practice to fire, fail to
hire, or discriminate with respect to terms and conditions of employment against individual because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
2. Id. § 2000e(b). Congress originally set the threshold that qualified a company as an employer
at twenty-five, then lowered it in the 1972 amendments. See Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347
F.3d 72, 82 (3d Cir. 2003). Compare H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 26 (1963), reprinted in EEOC,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2095, 2108 (1964)
(Separate Minority Views of Hon. Richard H. Poff and Hon. William Cramer) (criticizing 1964 bill
for setting "magic number" of employees at twenty-five), with STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF
THE S. COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1283 (Comm. Print 1972) (statement of Sen. Cotton)
(criticizing effort to lower employee-number requirement further).
3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(l).
4. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, __, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2755 (2004) (defining
jurisdiction as "the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject"); Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) ("Jurisdiction is power to declare the law,
Vol. 80:643, 2005
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could be one to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted,5 in that the fact goes to the substantive merits of the
plaintiffs claim and the failure to plead and prove this fact means the
plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of federal law.
6
Defining a fact issue as going to jurisdiction or merits carries
primarily practical consequences for the time and manner in which that
issue will be adjudicated and resolved within the litigation process. 7 It
also has formalist 8 consequences based in the inherent value of treating
distinct legal concepts in a distinct manner.9 Unfortunately, courts often
fail to maintain what should be a clear line between the concepts.
The result is confusion and incoherence among lower courts as to
whether to treat the quantum-of-employees element in federal
employment discrimination actions 0 as going to jurisdiction or to
substantive merits." And the problem is not confined to employment
discrimination. Courts mischaracterize factual elements under several
federal causes of action, notably the requirement of an agreement in
and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact
and dismissing the cause." (quoting Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868))); Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) ("[J]urisdiction is a question of whether a federal court
has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, to hear a case .... ) (emphasis
in original); see also Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613,
1620 (2003) (arguing that jurisdiction is matter of "something like legitimate authority").
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
6. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 237 (defining cause of action "to refer roughly to the alleged invasion of
'recognized legal rights' upon which a litigant based his claim for relief") (footnote and citations
omitted).
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. 1 use "formalism" in the ordinary sense of an "excessive adherence to prescribed forms."
CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 532 (9th ed. 1995). For our purposes,
this means the prescribed form of a grant of jurisdiction or a law establishing or addressing
substantive merits.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. Confusion arises not only with respect to Title VII, but also the major federal employment
anti-discrimination statutes that are modeled on Title VII and that similarly reach only companies
with a minimum number of employees. See Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir.
1999). These include the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a)(5)(A)
(2000) (fifteen employees); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (2000) (twenty employees); and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 261 l(4)(A)(i) (2000) (fifty employees). The FMLA, which requires employers to provide unpaid
leave so employees can care for ill family members, was enacted to combat sex discrimination in
employment. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003).
11. See infra Part II.
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restraint of trade affecting commerce under the Sherman Antitrust Act12
and the requirement of action under color of state law in constitutional
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'"
The primary justification for treating these facts as going to the
court's jurisdiction is the conclusion that they are "jurisdictional
elements"-elemental facts that link the statute to congressional
constitutional power to enact a particular federal law.14 In fact, quantum
of employees, properly understood, is not a jurisdictional element of
Title VII. 15 More importantly, even if it were (and other identifiable
elements in these and other federal causes of action surely are), true
"jurisdictional elements" establish legislative power to create a cause of
action, but have nothing to do with judicial authority to adjudicate that
cause of action."
The analytical touchstone of the distinction between jurisdiction and
merits is a proper conception of congressional power. That power
divides into two categories: (1) structural powers, through which
Congress enacts statutes establishing judicial jurisdiction over classes of
cases; and (2) substantive powers, through which Congress enacts a
different set of statutes creating causes of action for relief.17 Because
jurisdictional and substantive statutes are drafted as exercises of these
distinct powers, ' 8 judicial analysis of both subject-matter jurisdiction and
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
14. See Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 81 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Matthew D.
Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV.
1105, 1153 (2003) ("Congress sometimes chooses to include in its statutes a 'jurisdictional
nexus'-that is, a requirement that the government prove that the acts to which a statute is applied
in a given case themselves affect interstate commerce.").
15. See Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 81; infra Part IV.A.1.
16. See infra Part IV.A.2.
17. See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2001)
(describing "clear analytical distinction" between jurisdiction and cognizable cause of action); John
Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2513,
2514 (1998); infra notes 148-76 and accompanying text.
18. Evan Tsen Lee argues that there is no essential difference between jurisdiction and merits. See
Lee, supra note 4, at 1614; infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. Congress thus has greater
discretion to mix its powers and to mix jurisdiction and merits, as by declaring that federal courts
have original jurisdiction over all federal law claims on which the plaintiff states a claim upon
which relief can be granted or on which the plaintiff ultimately prevails. Lee, supra note 4, at 1627
(arguing that nothing prevents legislature from tying jurisdictional inquiry to equities, just as
nothing prevents legislature from divorcing liability rule from equities). But see Kevin M. Clermont,
Jurisdictional Fact 4 (Coruell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-013, 2005) ("[W]e also know
Vol. 80:643, 2005
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the ultimate merits of the action must focus only on the appropriate
positive-law 19 provision at the appropriate point in the litigation process.
A court measures its subject-matter jurisdiction by examining the
language of the jurisdiction-granting statute. ° If it finds the statutory
terms satisfied, the court must conclude that it has subject-matter
jurisdiction and the power to address and resolve the merits of the claims
in favor of one or the other party.21 In determining jurisdiction, the court
need not and should not engage in any further factual inquiries tied to
the cause of action, such as whether our Title VII defendant has fifteen
employees. As a matter of positive law, that fact has "substantive
relevance" to the plaintiffs claim.22 It therefore goes only to the merits
of that claim, to whether the plaintiff has stated and proven a remediable
violation of her substantive federal rights.23
Part I of this Article describes litigation as a three-stage process, in
which particular issues are decided by particular decision-makers at
particular stages. Parts II and III demonstrate how courts and
commentators err in characterizing as jurisdictional particular facts that,
properly understood, go to the merits of a plaintiffs federal
constitutional or statutory claim, and consider the consequences of that
that the plaintiff should not have to prove her cause of action in order to establish jurisdiction....")
(emphasis in original), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.efm?abstractjid=694341;
Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 166
(1953) (arguing that "power of the court to hear and decide a case could hardly be made to depend
upon the jury's verdict").
I provide preliminary responses to Lee below. See infra notes 129-47 and accompanying text. I
leave a fuller response, and a broader analysis of the limitations on Congress' power to merge
jurisdiction and merits (grounded in the jury right and procedural clarity), for a later article.
19. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) ("[L]aw in the sense in which courts
speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it." (quoting Black & White
Taxicab Co. & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting))); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 253 (1961) (recognizing one
element of positivism as understanding that laws are commands of human beings); Patrick J.
Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New
World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEx. L. REV. 79, 116 (1993) ("The positivist conception of
law ... defined law as a command of a sovereign.").
20. See. e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (granting district courts original jurisdiction "of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"); see infra notes 238-
68 and accompanying text.
21. See Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 1216; Mishkin, supra note 18, at 166.
22. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 82 [hereinafter Brilmayer, Due Process].
23. See infra Part V.
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muddied analysis in light of the three-stage process. Part IV examines,
and rejects, possible explanations for the confused analysis. Finally, Part
V proposes a proper approach for characterizing facts and distinguishing
between jurisdiction and merits, an approach that respects and maintains
a clean line between necessarily distinct concepts.
I. JURISDICTION, MERITS, AND THE ADJUDICATIVE
PROCESS
Adjudication is a highly formal method of public decision-making. It
is well known that the overwhelming majority of cases do not go to trial
for final resolution of real-world legal and factual disputes by judge or
jury.24 But adjudication, properly understood, is broader than trial.25 In
Lon Fuller's classic description:
[A]djudication is a form of decision that defines the affected
party's participation as that of offering proofs and reasoned
arguments. It is not so much that adjudicators decide only issues
presented by claims of right or accusations. The point is rather
that whatever they decide, or whatever is submitted to them for
decision, tends to be converted into a claim of right or an
accusation of fault or guilt.
26
24. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial
Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, I J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 706 (2004) (citing statistics showing that percentage of civil cases
terminated by bench or jury trial was 1.8% in 2002); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater:
The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 767 (1993) [hereinafter Marcus,
Bathwater] (describing attitude among federal judges that trial represents judicial failure); Judith
Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for
Settlement, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 155, 157 [hereinafter Resnik, Litigant Preferences] (citing 2000
statistics showing that trial was begun in only three of 100 civil cases); Judith Resnik, Trial as
Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 111, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924,
925-26 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error] (repeating comment of federal trial judge that
even small number of trials reflected attorney failure); see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement,
93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss, Against Settlement] (criticizing preference for
negotiated resolution in lieu of judicial determination, in light of broader purpose of public-law
adjudication to not merely resolve public disputes, but "to explicate and give force to the values
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to
bring reality into accord with them").
25. See Hadfield, supra note 24, at 706-07 (arguing that cases can be disposed of in many other
ways besides poles of trial and settlement); Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 24, at 928
(emphasizing that one should not "equate the frequency of adjudication (decisionmaking by a judge)
with the frequency of trials (by either judge or jury)").
26. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 369 (1978)
Vol. 80:643, 2005
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Adjudication means that whatever is in dispute between the parties and
must be decided by the adjudicator, the process of deciding "grants to
the affected party a form of participation that consists in the opportunity
to present proofs and reasoned arguments. 27
We should conceive of litigation under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as a three-phase process. The phases need not occur
sequentially and often overlap in time. Adjudication--decision-making
via Fuller's unique participatory and reasoned approach-occurs at all
three phases; at each, the court iterates constitutional and statutory texts
and values.28 The difference among the phases lies in the issues
adjudicated, the identity of the adjudicator, and the manner of
adjudication.
At the first phase, a court adjudicates preliminary procedural issues
going to whether the dispute over real-world facts and obligations can be
resolved in this particular court between these particular parties at this
particular time.29 Of these, a federal court's determination that it has
(emphasis in original). Owen Fiss rejects Fuller's emphasis on individual participation as rooted in
the paradigm of private-law contracts litigation and thus no longer reflecting the reality of public
law litigation. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 44 (1979)
[hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice]. Even accepting that point, Fiss nevertheless recognizes that
adjudication entails reason and arguments of interested parties to the dispute before the court,
although speaking through a singular representative rather than each individually. See id. at 42
("[R]eason enters the process, not through the arguments of each and every individual affected, but
through the arguments of the spokesmen for all the interests represented and through the decision of
the judge. Reason is used to give meaning to our constitutional values.").
27. Fuller, supra note 26, at 369; see H. Jefferson Powell, The Three Independences, 38 U. RICH.
L. REv. 603, 611 (2004) (arguing that adjudication involves judgment that proceeds from different
premises and operates within different constraints). Fiss describes those constraints as including
rules requiring that courts listen to a broad range of persons, speak back and respond to the issues or
grievances presented, and justify their decisions. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 26, at 13.
28. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 26, at 44 ("The function of adjudication is to give
meaning to public values, not merely to resolve disputes."); see also Patricia M. Wald, Summary
Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1897, 1897 (1998) (arguing that most federal jurisprudence is
made at summary judgment).
29. See HART, supra note 19, at 92 (calling these "secondary rules" which "specify the ways in
which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the
fact of their violation conclusively determined"); Clermont, supra note 18, at 12-13 (describing
process for raising such "forum-authority defenses"); Lee, supra note 4, at 1622 n.30 (stating that
jurisdiction "undoubtedly also serves an important choice-of-forum function"); Michael Wells,
Positivism and Antipositivism in Federal Courts Law, 29 GA. L. REv. 655, 684 (1995) (arguing that
secondary rules "merely determine the forums in which conflicting claims regarding rights and
obligations defined by other bodies of law may be adjudicated").
These preliminaries include jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, see FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(l); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), jurisdiction over the parties to
Washington Law Review Vol. 80:643, 2005
jurisdiction over the subject matter in dispute should be most critical.3°
In general, subject-matter jurisdiction is a court's constitutional and
statutory31 power or authority to entertain, hear, decide, and resolve a
legal or factual dispute in favor of one party or the other.32 Any doubts
the dispute, see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980), and proper venue within the federal system, see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000). The case-or-controversy requirement of Article III imposes
additional requirements. See Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807
(2003) (stating that ripeness is justiciability doctrine that enables courts to avoid premature
adjudication of merely abstract disagreements); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,
102 (1998) ("Standing to sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a
justiciable case."); United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)
("A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.").
30. See Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 1273-74 ("For the Court... this principle of limited federal
power operates primarily through the formal threshold requirement of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.") (emphasis in original); Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in
the Federal Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235, 241 (1999) [hereinafter Idleman, Hypothetical
Jurisdiction] ("For both constitutional and institutional reasons, the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts is jealously guarded by its Article III keepers."); id. at 251 ("Congress-let alone
the separation of powers-might be doubly offended by the unauthorized exercise of judicial
power."); see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101 (describing subject-matter jurisdiction as "an essential
ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain
times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects").
31. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 83 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that federal courts can hear cases only if Constitution has
authorized courts to hear such cases and Congress has vested that power in federal courts); Idleman,
Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 250-51 ("After all, the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts does not flow directly from Article I1l; rather, the jurisdictional grants of Article III must be
first affirmed by statute."); James Leonard, Ubi Remedium lbi Jus, or, Where There's a Remedy,
There's a Right: A Skeptic's Critique ofEx Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 277 (2004)
("[T]he jurisdiction of the lower courts is a matter of legislative discretion and not of 'need' defined
from Article III."); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 25 (1980)
("Courts and commentators agree that Congress' discretion in granting jurisdiction to the lower
federal courts implies that those courts take jurisdiction from Congress and not from article III.");
see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (referring to subject-matter jurisdiction as "the courts' statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case") (emphasis in original).
32. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, _, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2755 (2004) (defining
statute as "jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases
concerned with a certain subject"); Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 ("'Jurisdiction is power to declare the
law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the
fact and dismissing the cause."' (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)));
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining
subject-matter jurisdiction as "power to adjudicate"); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n. 18
(1979) ("[J]urisdiction is a question of whether a federal court has the power, under the Constitution
or laws of the United States, to hear a case .... ") (emphasis in original); Hagans v. Lavine, 415
650
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about subject-matter jurisdiction should be raised and resolved at the
threshold of litigation; a federal court should not reach the merits of a
claim unless and until it has satisfied itself that it is the proper forum and
that it has the structural authority to resolve the legal and factual issues
presented by the dispute between the present parties.33
The significant aspect of first-phase adjudication is that the court
resolves issues as to any facts on which subject-matter jurisdiction (and
other preliminaries) tuMs.3 4 The court (trial or appellate) must raise
U.S. 528, 538 (1974) ("Jurisdiction is essentially the authority conferred by Congress to decide a
given type of case one way or the other.") (citations omitted); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 718 (1838) ("Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject-matter
in controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over
them .... "); see also Lee, supra note 4, at 1620 (arguing that jurisdiction is not matter of power,
but of "something like legitimate authority"); Sager, supra note 31, at 22 ("[S]ubject-matter
jurisdiction in our legal system refers to the motive force of a court, the root power to adjudicate a
specified set of controversies. Ultimately, jurisdiction is an essential part of what makes a court a
court .... ).
33. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 88-89 (stating that jurisdiction "would normally be considered a
threshold question that must be resolved ... before proceeding to the merits"); id. at 101 -02 ("For a
court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no
jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires."); id. at Ill (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("That order of decision (first jurisdiction then the
merits) helps better to restrict the use of the federal courts to those adversarial disputes that Article
III defines as the federal judiciary's business."); Idleman, Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30,
at 318 ("Narrowly viewed, the basic principle ... is that an Article III court cannot decide the merits
of a dispute without first verifying that the Article III case-or-controversy requirements have been
satisfied."); see also Jack H. Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258,
259 (2000) ("[Flederal courts have generally assumed that unless a federal court has subject-matter
jurisdiction, it cannot determine any other issue in a case."); Idleman, Hypothetical Jurisdiction,
supra note 30, at 243 ("If a court finds subject-matter jurisdiction, it may then proceed. If, however,
the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot decide the case on the merits.
It has no authority to do so.") (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted); Joan
Steinman, After Steel Co.: "Hypothetical Jurisdiction " in the Federal Appellate Courts, 58 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 855, 860-61 (2001) ("[L]ower federal courts will not reach merits questions without
first determining that an Article IIl case or controversy is present.").
Note that all procedural preliminaries are part of the phase-one analysis because the Supreme
Court, while insistent that courts resolve jurisdiction before merits, does not similarly insist that a
court resolve subject-matter jurisdiction before personal jurisdiction or venue. See Ruhrgas A.G. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999) ("[T]here is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy.").
34. See Clermont, supra note 18, at 13-14 & n.38; Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of
Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 60-61 (2001)
[hereinafter Idleman, Resequencing] ("[A] court has the power to resolve any factual dispute
regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and may hold an evidentiary
hearing... necessary to evaluate its jurisdiction.") (alteration in original; footnotes, citations, and
internal quotation marks omitted); Wald, supra note 28, at 1931-32 (describing court's power to
resolve factual issues when necessary to determine subject-matter jurisdiction); Louise Weinberg,
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subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte at any time in the process if the
court's independent analysis suggests that jurisdiction is lacking35-such
as when the court believes that some fact on which jurisdiction turns is
absent. The parties similarly can raise jurisdictional defects, and the facts
on which those defects may rest, at any time.36
The second and third phases of the process both focus on the merits of
the plaintiff's cause of action, but in distinct manners. The second phase
entails a merits preview. 37 The point at this phase is not to resolve
disputes of historical fact between the parties, but merely to determine
whether there are any disputes of historical fact to be resolved at trial.38
Courts examine and weed-out what Paul Carrington calls "manifestly
unfounded contentions"--those claims and defenses that are "so
meritless that it is unjust to an adversary to accord them plenary
consideration., 39 The question is whether there is some legal (as opposed
Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REv. 1235, 1317 (2003) ("[T]he plaintiff must not only plead jurisdiction,
but be prepared to argue it, and if necessary, prove it."); see also Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323
F.3d 920, 925 (1Ith Cir. 2003) (stating that jurisdictional challenges "lie within the exclusive
province of the trial court" and that court may independently weigh facts); United Phosphorus, Ltd.
v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 958 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wood, D., J., dissenting)
("[D]istrict courts resolve whatever jurisdictional facts are contested in advance of the trial.").
Clermont suggests that, in the main run of cases, the applicable standard of proof is preponderance
of the evidence. Clermont, supra note 18, at 1.
35. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."); Ins. Corp.
of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
36. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2004) (addressing motion to dismiss
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction brought by defendant after jury returned verdict for plaintiff),
cert. granted,_ U.S. - (May 16, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2246 (2005).
37. See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REv. 1849, 1851 (2004) (describing use of dispositive
motions for merits review to dismiss before trial any "'untriable' or otherwise legally untenable"
claims); Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 24, at 937 ("Today the unhyphenated 'pretrial' is a stage
unto itself, no longer a prelude to trial but rather assumed to be the way to end a case without-
trial.").
38. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 455 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus, Fact Pleading] ("[G]iven the
impossibility of actually trying all civil cases, logic seems to favor pretrial disposition."); Arthur R.
Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "'Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis, " and
Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv.
982, 1063 (2003) (arguing that procedures at this stage are designed to screen out cases not worthy
of trial).
39. Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067,
2087 (1989); see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
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to factual) defect in the plaintiffs claim that makes trial by a finder of
fact unnecessary and the action one that can be resolved by the court
pre-trial.4°
Second-phase preview entails two inquiries.41 First, the court reviews
the four comers of the plaintiffs pleading to determine whether the
allegations state a claim on which relief can be granted 42 by satisfying
federal notice-pleading requirements of a "short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... ,, The district
court should grant a 12(b)(6) motion and dismiss a claim only if it
"appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.",
44
Second, the parties and the court move beyond pleadings and
preliminarily consider evidence revealed during discovery and what that
evidence indicates about the validity of the plaintiffs claim.45 During or
following discovery, the court may consider a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56(c).46 Summary judgment entails a review of the
507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993) (stating that courts and litigants should rely on pretrial dispositive
motions and control of discovery to "weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later").
40. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376, 405 (1982) (arguing that large
number of federal civil suits are dismissed because of legal defects); Wald, supra note 28, at 1926
("As a general matter, many of our judges seem determined to get rid of dubious-looking cases at
the early stages .... ).
41. See Wald, supra note 28, at 1918 (describing "structural theory of the Rules," under which
court should look first to pleading alone, then to any outside material offered, after reasonable
opportunity for discovery).
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
43. Id. 8(a)(2); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) ("[A]II the Rules require is 'a short
and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests."); Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L.
REv. 551, 561 (2002) [hereinafter Fairman, Heightened Pleading] (arguing that Rule 8 requires that
"a claim be stated with brevity, conciseness, and clarity").
44. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
45. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 987, 993 (2003)
[hereinafter Fairman, Myth] ("The modem discovery tools enable every party to obtain disclosure of
all relevant, unprivileged information in the possession of another .... [Tihey continue to serve the
vital function of factual development .. "); Marcus, Fact Pleading, supra note 38, at 440 ("Rather
than dwell on pleading niceties, under the new system litigants were to use the expanded discovery
mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules to get to the merits of the case.").
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ("The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if... there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and.., the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law."); see also Miller, supra note 38, at 1048-49 (describing increased use of summary
judgment motions); Wald, supra note 28, at 1897 ("Federal jurisprudence is largely the product of
summary judgment in civil cases.").
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factual story about real-world events as suggested by the evidence, to
determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material (i.e., outcome-
determinative 47) fact that can be resolved only at trial by the trier of
fact.48 In its theoretically pure form, summary judgment is proper only if
there are no such disputes of material fact and no reasonable fact finder
could find in favor of the nonmoving party. 49 As one commentator put it,
on summary judgment "the court cannot try issues of fact; it only
determines if there are issues to be tried., 50
To the extent that there are genuine factual disputes, the case must
proceed to the third phase-trial on the merits. Cases rarely reach this
point; most either settle or are resolved at one of the first two phases. 51 If
the case is one of the few that does go to trial, factual issues are
The Rules permit a plaintiff to move for summary judgment at any time after twenty days from
the commencement of the action, see FED. R. CIv. P. 56(a), and a defendant to move for summary
judgment at any time, see FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b). But summary judgment contemplates a focus on
evidence, rather than pleadings; thus the motion should be ruled upon only after the parties have had
an opportunity to conduct discovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (permitting court to delay ruling on
motion to permit parties to engage in discovery); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (permitting court to convert
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into motion for summary judgment, but requiring that parties be given
"reasonable opportunity" to present pertinent evidentiary material); see also Wald, supra note 28, at
1918 ("The plaintiff had better be prepared to put her best case forward, fast, to stay in court at
all."). But see id. at 1926 (criticizing reluctance of judges to allow discovery before awarding
summary judgment).
47. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating that summary judgment is
appropriate after adequate time for discovery "against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial"); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986) ("As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude
the entry of summary judgment.").
48. See Marcus, Fact Pleading, supra note 38, at 484 ("[T]he intermediate step of summary
judgment exists precisely to enable courts to examine the factual conclusions of the pleader and
determine whether they are supported by sufficient evidence to warrant the time and effort of a
trial.").
49. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51 (agreeing that standard on summary judgment is whether
"under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict" and that
summary judgment is improper if "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence").
50. Fairman, Myth, supra note 45, at 993; see Wald, supra note 28, at 1897 (arguing that purpose
of summary judgment is to "weed out frivolous and sham cases, and cases for which the law had a
quick and definitive answer").
51. See supra notes 29-50 and accompanying text. Randy Kozel and David Rosenberg recently
proposed a solution to the problem of nuisance-value lawsuits designed to coerce the defendant into
settling, by requiring the filing of a second-phase dispositive motion before the parties may enter
into an enforceable settlement agreement. See Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 1860.
Jurisdiction and Merits
resolved, inferences from facts are drawn, and controlling substantive
law is applied to those facts to determine whether the defendant's
conduct abridged the plaintiffs rights.52 Responsibility for resolving
factual disputes often (although not always) rests with the unique
American institution1
3 of the civil jury.54
A defendant may assert in a single motion to dismiss both a phase-one
issue such as lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the phase-two issue
of failure to state a claim on the merits. 55 And the increasing use of
settlement and alternative dispute resolution devices, such as arbitration
and mediation, 56 may (depending on how one views it) either add new
options to second-phase merits analysis or pull the case off the three-
phase track and into a private, non-judicial, and perhaps non-
adjudicative mode of resolution.
Unfortunately, courts tend to depart from this formal structure. For
52. Cf Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 1216 ("[A] party who cleared the jurisdictional hurdle would
fin[d] a court clothed with entire power to do justice according to law, or according to equity,
whichever he appeals to.") (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
53. See Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 33 ("For two centuries, we Americans have nurtured our faith in the civil jury.");
Miller, supra note 38, at 1077 ("Jury trial is both unique and central to the American legal system. It
has been revered as a method of establishing the truth and as a safeguard against both the imposition
of a morality by the elite and a tyranny of the state."); Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must
Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
183, 183 (2000) (describing one view of civil jury as "a cornerstone of democratic government, a
protection against incompetent or oppressive judges, and a way for the people to have an active role
in the process of justice").
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .. "); Marcus, Fact Pleading,
supra note 38, at 440 (arguing that proper method for resolving disputed merits was trial by jury);
Miller, supra note 38, at 1083 ("'When there is a dispute as to what acts or events have actually
occurred, or what conditions have actually existed, the jury has the task of resolving the conflict. Its
role is to evaluate the evidence and to reconstruct what took place, as it would have appeared to an
objective on-the-scene observer."' (quoting Stephen Weiner, Civil Jury Trial, 54 CAL. L. REV.
1867, 1869-70 (1966))); Moses, supra note 53, at 202 (describing "fundamental role of the jury to
find facts").
55. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(g) (providing that party making Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss "may
join with it any other motions herein provided for and then available to the party").
56. See id. 16(c)(9) (enumerating subjects for consideration at pretrial conference, including
"settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute"); Fiss, Against
Settlement, supra note 24, at 1083 ("The allure of settlement in large part derives from the fact that
it avoids the need for a trial."); Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 24, at 926 ("Found in rules and
policy statements of the federal judiciary are increasing obligations ofjudges to press parties toward
settlement."); Resnik, Litigant Preferences, supra note 24, at 157 (describing development of
mandates for judges to raise issues of settlement and alternative dispute resolution).
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example, commentators criticize courts for an increasing willingness to
57resolve disputed facts at summary judgment. For our purposes, courts
also depart from this three-phase structure when they fail properly to
characterize issues and thus to recognize the place and manner for their
adjudication within the formal three-phase process. On the one hand are
factual and legal issues that go to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction,
adjudicated at the first phase of litigation with the court as fact finder; on
the other are factual and legal issues that go to whether the plaintiff has
pleaded and established a violation of her protected substantive federal
rights, adjudicated at the second or third phases, depending on the
existence of material factual disputes. 58  When courts confusejurisdictional facts and law with merits facts and law, issues are
adjudicated and resolved at the wrong time and in the wrong manner by
the wrong fact finder within the adjudicative process.
II. ILLUSTRATING CONFUSION
Trial courts most often are called upon to define an issue as going to
merits or jurisdiction in the situation described in our primary example:
The plaintiff files a claim, the defendant moves to dismiss-either for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim (or both,
in the altemative) 59
-and the court must properly characterize the
motion and determine when and how to resolve it.60 The issue could
come before the court in two other contexts. First, whether a fact issue
57. See Wald, supra note 28, at 1917 (arguing that summary judgment frequently is converted
into "something more like a gestalt verdict based on an early snapshot of the case"); see also Miller,
supra note 38, at 1092 (arguing that when facts are undisputed but different inferences may be
drawn from those undisputed facts, there is dispute of fact to be settled by jury); Wald, supra note
28, at 1938 (describing willingness of courts to refuse to draw factual inferences in favor of
nonmovant and to grant summary judgment on ground that no reasonable fact finder could come out
any other way).
58. See Clermont, supra note 18, at 20 ("[T]he court should avoid treating a jurisdictional motion
like a demurrer.").
59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(l), (b)(6); see, e.g., Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 76(3d Cir. 2003) (involving defendant moving to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Papa
v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 1999) (involving district court agreeing that
defendant was not employer and dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Wascura v.
Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 684 (11 th Cir. 1999) (involving defendant moving to dismiss for failure to
state claim, appellate court converting motion to one to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction).
60. See supra Part I.
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goes to jurisdiction or to merits dictates whether the court must raise sua
sponte the absence of that fact in a given case, which it must if that fact
is jurisdictional.61 Second, a court may need to characterize a fact in
order to determine whether it has been conclusively determined in a
prior action and whether prior determination precludes relitigation of the
* 62issue.
Quantum of employees under Title VII and the major federal
employment discrimination statutes modeled on it63 illustrates the
entanglement of jurisdiction and merits. These statutes apply only to
employers, defined as entities with a minimum number of employees64
that are engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce. That is,
the statutes control the conduct of, and subject to possible liability, only
entities that meet the statutory definition of employer. There is a deep
circuit split, and a tremendous amount of confusion, as to how to
characterize and address quantum of employees.65 The Supreme Court
61. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 10.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (Title VII) (defining employer as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks"); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2000) (ADEA) (defining employer as "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks"); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2000)
(FMLA) (defining employer as "any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity
affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or
more calendar workweeks").
65. Compare Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 83 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that
fifteen-employee threshold is substantive element of Title VII and not jurisdictional), and Da Silva
v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 2000) (same), and Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166
F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir.
1998)) ("[T]he issue is not jurisdictional."), and EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117
F.3d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[C]overage under the ADA forms an element of the plaintiff's
cause of action rather than a prerequisite to the district court's jurisdiction .... ), with Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 225 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he employee census finding is determinative of
subject matter jurisdiction."), cert. granted - U.S. _ (May 16, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2246 (2005),
and Hukill v. Auto Care, Inc., 192 F.3d 437, 441 (4th Cir. 1999) ("A district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over an FMLA claim if the defendant is not an employer as that term is defined
in the FMLA."), and Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 961 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Whether the
appellees constitute an 'employer' within the definition of Title VII is a threshold jurisdictional
issue."), and Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 685 (1 1th Cir. 1999) ("[W]here a defendant in an
FMLA suit does not meet the statutory definition of 'employer,' there is no federal subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim against that defendant."), and Greenlees v. Eidenmuller Enter., Inc., 32
F.3d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that district court lacked jurisdiction where it found that
defendant employed fewer than fifteen employees). Cf Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1341-
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granted certiorari to resolve that split in the October 2005 term, in a Title
VII case in which the lower courts characterized employer status as a
jurisdictional fact.66
But the confusion is not limited to employment discrimination laws;
the problem arises in a number of federal causes of action. For example,
constitutional claims against state and local officials can be brought only
against persons acting "under color of' state or local law, a requirement
that overlaps with the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment (and incorporated Bill of Rights provisions).67 In the only
detailed judicial analysis, the Third Circuit concluded that state action,
or action under color of law, is not a question of jurisdiction; rather, it is
a phase-two merits issue, and the only question is whether the complaint
alleges sufficient facts, taken as true, from which state action would be
found.6 8 On the other hand, the Second Circuit more recently noted,
although without explanation, that courts have divided in their
conclusions.69
Another example is federal antitrust claims, in which the plaintiff
must show conduct constituting a restraint of "trade or commerce among
42 (6th Cir. 1983) (treating question of whether defendant was employer as jurisdictional, but
subject to summary judgment standard).
66. Arbaugh, 380 F.3d at 225.
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ([N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .. "); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured .. "); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("As a matter of substantive constitutional law the state-action
requirement reflects judicial recognition of the fact that 'most rights secured by the Constitution are
protected only against infringement by governments .... ' (quoting Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 156 (1978))).
If the plaintiff shows that the defendant was a state actor who could, as a matter of substantive
constitutional law, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendment, she simultaneously shows that the
defendant acted under color of state law so as to fall within the grasp of § 1983. See Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletics Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 n.2 (2001) ("If a defendant's
conduct satisfies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conduct also
constitutes action 'under color of state law' for § 1983 purposes." (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at
935)); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929 ("Having found state action under the Constitution, there was no
further inquiry into whether the action of the political associations also met the statutory
requirement of action 'under color of state law."').
68. Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1987).
69. See Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting circuit split); Idleman,
Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 323-24 n.365.
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the several States, or with foreign nations ... ,,70 The Supreme Court
has made contradictory suggestions as to how to characterize the fact of
whether the defendant's conduct affected interstate commerce. In
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,71 the Court reversed
the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a Sherman Act claim that had been based
on the plaintiffs failure to allege facts to establish effect on interstate
commerce, concluding that the complaint stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The Court noted, however, that the analysis
and outcome would be the same even if it viewed the dismissal as one
for want of jurisdiction.73 The Court sent similar mixed signals in
McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans.74 On the one hand, the
Court said that plaintiffs must show a not-insubstantial effect on
interstate commerce to "establish federal jurisdiction." 75 On the other,
the Court held that the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) and
Conley v. Gibson,76 which controls second-phase analysis, "applies with
no less force to a Sherman Act claim, where one of the requisites of a
cause of action is the existence of a demonstrable nexus between the
defendants' activity and interstate commerce. 7 7 Commentators are
similarly divided on whether the requirement of an interstate commerce
nexus is or should be jurisdictional or substantive. 8
It is noteworthy-and logically problematic for courts that treat any
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.").
71. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
72. Id. at 746-47; id. at 742 n. 1 ("We, too, will treat the dismissal as having been based on Rule
12(b)(6).").
73. See id. at 742 n.l.
74. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
75. Id. at 246.
76. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
77. McLain, 444 U.S. at 246.
78. Compare Stephen Calkins, The 1990-91 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: Toward Greater
Certainty, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 632 (1991) ("The Sherman Act sought to rely on the commerce
clause's authority by outlawing agreements 'in restraint of trade or commerce,' so this statutory
language limits what Congress did prohibit (which is probably not the same thing as what it could
prohibit today). Neither of these concerns limits the power of federal courts to hear cases initiated
by nonfrivolous complaints .... ") (emphasis in original), with Roxane C. Busey & Peter B.
Freeman, The View From the Summit: Jurisdiction and Beyond, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 726 n.9
(1991) ("[T]he Supreme Court has consistently referred to the issue as a question of
jurisdiction .... ").
659
Washington Law Review Vol. 80:643, 2005
of these facts as jurisdictional-that they mix jurisdiction and merits
only as to one fact under each of these statutes. Courts are uniform in
treating all other elements in the statutes as going to the merits-to
whether the plaintiff has stated or proven a remediable violation of
federal law. It is unquestionably a merits issue in an employment
discrimination action whether the plaintiff is an employee as opposed to
an independent contractor,79 whether the plaintiff is a member of the
statutorily protected class,80 or whether the defendant engaged in the
type of employment practices made unlawful by the statute.8 ' Courts are
similarly clear that it is a merits question whether a public official's
conduct in fact deprived the plaintiff of a protected constitutional right82
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000) ("The term 'employee' means an individual employed by an
employer .. "); 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (2000) ("The term 'employee' means an individual employed
by any employer .. "); see also, e.g., EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 698
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that, in order to show ADEA violation, adversely affected individuals must
establish that they were employees); Farlow v. Wachovia Bank of N.C., N.A., 259 F.3d 309, 316
(4th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of summary judgment based on determination that plaintiff in Title
VII action was independent contractor, not employee); Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104
F.3d 1256, 1267 (11 th Cir. 1997) (holding that there was genuine issue of material fact precluding
summary judgment as to whether plaintiff was employee or independent contractor).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (defining "disability" as "physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual"); id. § 12111(8)
(defining "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires"); see also, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184, 198 (2002) ("[T]o be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must
have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives. The impairment's impact must also be permanent or
long term."); id. at 187 (reversing summary judgment determination on this point); Storey v. Bums
Int'l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 766 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica, C.J., concurring) (arguing that plaintiff
who described himself as "Confederate Southern-American" had not established himself as member
of protected legitimate national original classification for Title VII purposes); Marinelli v. City of
Erie, 216 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that plaintiff must establish that she is qualified
person with disability in order to state cognizable cause of action under ADA).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (defining unlawful employment practice as discrimination
"because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); see also, e.g., Bibby v.
Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Because the evidence produced
by [the plaintiff]-and indeed, his very claim-indicated only that he was being harassed on the
basis of his sexual orientation, rather than because of his sex, the District Court properly determined
that there was no cause of action under Title VII."); Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1130 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that it is merits issue whether provision of ADA prohibiting discrimination by public
entities encompasses employment discrimination by that public entity).
82. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003) (plurality opinion) (holding that
plaintiff cannot prove violation of Fifth Amendment when his statements were not used against him
in court); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (holding
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or whether a Sherman Act defendant entered into a contract, conspiracy,
or agreement that was, in fact, in restraint of trade.83
Given that confusion of jurisdiction and merits most frequently occurs
in employment discrimination and constitutional claims, one could
characterize this as another example of federal courts misapplying (or
narrowly applying) procedures in a way that disadvantages civil rights
claimants.84 At the very least, it could be seen as federal courts
misapplying procedures in a way that disparately disadvantages
plaintiffs availing themselves of far-reaching federal laws. After all,
federal courts arguably are no more solicitous of antitrust plaintiffs than
of civil rights plaintiffs.85
Two points cut against this view. First, it seems incoherent to
disadvantage plaintiffs with regard to one element but not other elements
of the same statutory cause of action.86 If the purpose is to make it easier
for courts to dispose of Title VII cases when the defendant is not an
employer, why not also make it easier for courts to dispose of cases
when the plaintiff is not an employee? 87  Second, resolving the
merits/jurisdiction confusion and addressing each in the procedurally
appropriate time and manner will not necessarily alter the outcome of
the case. If a defendant does not have fifteen employees, the Title VII
that plaintiff could not state claim for violation of substantive due process where state had no
constitutional obligation to protect plaintiff from private harm); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
329-30 (1986) (holding that plaintiff's § 1983 claim could succeed only if he could prove violation
of underlying constitutional right, including scienter requirement inherent in constitutional right).
83. See, e.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that to survive 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss antitrust plaintiff must plead contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade).
84. See, e.g., Fairman, Myth, supra note 45, at 1027-28 (arguing that "the oak of judicially-
imposed heightened pleading" sprang up to "thwart would-be fears of meritless claims and harassed
defendants" in civil rights action); Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note 43, at 574 (arguing
that judicially imposed heightened pleading in civil rights cases "arose out of the twin rationales of
presumption of frivolousness and protection of the defendant"); Marcus, Bathwater, supra note 24,
at 775-76 (describing concern for particular impact of procedural rules on identifiable groups);
Howard M. Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A Study in Section 1983
Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 805-06 & n.60 (2003).
85. See Fairman, Myth, supra note 45, at 1059 (arguing that heightened pleading requirements
generally derive from judicial concern for protecting defendants); Marcus, Fact Pleading, supra
note 38, at 445-46 (describing how courts have adopted stricter pleading rules as antidote to pro-
plaintiff biases in system of lax pleading).
86. See infra Part IV.
87. The merits question of whether the plaintiff is a proper party under a statute often gets
confused with the question of whether the plaintiff has standing, a separate Article III concern.
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claim will fail; if the defendant is not a state actor, the constitutional
claim will fail. That will be true whether the court resolves the fact issue
as part of its jurisdictional analysis or the jury (or court) does so at trial
on the merits. The former permits earlier disposition of the issue and,
potentially, the entire action if the judge resolves factual disputes
without need for trial. 88 However, because the goal is to ensure that the
issue is decided by the correct decision-maker at the correct point in the
process, such expediency goals should not enter the calculus.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF CONFUSION
Two consequences flow from the characterization of a particular fact
as jurisdictional or merits-related. The first is procedural-the time and
manner in which that fact is resolved in the adjudicative process. The
second is formalist89-Congress treats jurisdiction and merits differently
in its various statutory enactments and, in a formalist framework, distinct
concepts should be addressed in a distinct manner. 90
A. Procedural Consequences
The primary consequence will be the time and manner of adjudicating
a factual dispute within the litigation process. Confusing whether a fact
issue goes to jurisdiction or merits produces uncertainty as to when the
issue should be resolved, by whom, and under what standard, along with
confusion as to the meaning of that resolution.
If a fact goes to the court's jurisdiction, it is adjudicated in the first
phase. The court examines evidence, makes findings, and resolves
disputes as to those facts on which the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction turns. 9' Those facts, having been found by the trial court,
will be subject to somewhat deferential review for clear error on
appeal.92 And a 12(b)(1) dismissal will be without prejudice, meaning
88. See Wald, supra note 28, at 1931-32.
89. See supra note 8.
90. Cf Owens v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 319 U.S. 715, 721 (1943) (stating that distinct concepts
having distinct consequences should be treated in distinct manner).
91. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B.
92. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact [made by the district court], whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."); Scarfo v.
Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960 (1lth Cir. 1999) ("We review the district court's findings of
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the plaintiff will have an opportunity to refile her claims in an
appropriate forum, most likely state court.
93
On the other hand, if a particular fact goes to the merits of the claim,
it should be resolved according to the processes of the second and third
phases of litigation. The court cannot make findings on this fact. In a
Title VII action, the plaintiffs allegation in the complaint that the
defendant has fifteen employees must be taken as true on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.94 On summary judgment, the court only should consider whether
there is a dispute as to quantum of employees based on evidence
gathered in discovery, denying summary judgment if there is such a
factual dispute.95
To the extent there is a dispute as to the factual elements of the
plaintiff's claim, summary judgment is inappropriate. The dispute must
be resolved at the third phase, trial on the merits by the finder of fact,
usually a jury.96 The jury's findings will be subject to more deferential
jurisdictional facts for clear error."). This is less deferential than review of merits facts found by a
jury, but more deferential than review of other pretrial issues. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus
Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (arguing that appellate courts will be
unable to give plenary consideration to sensitive issues that can arise in some cases). But see Lynn
M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405, 1438 (2000)
("[T]he judges' determinations of fact are for all practical purposes unappealable.").
93. See Idleman, Resequencing, supra note 34, at 83 n.449; Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry
Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and Money Claims Against the United States,
71 GEO. WASH. L REv. 602, 695-96 n.650 (2003) (stating that plaintiff will be able to pursue
second action on same cause of action when "' [t]he plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory
of case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on
the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 26(l)(c) (1980))).
94. See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125 (1998). Should the plaintiff fail to allege in her
complaint that the defendant is an employer, a court ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion may find the
complaint factually (as opposed to legally) deficient and dismiss. But the motion likely will be
granted without prejudice and the plaintiff given leave to replead the necessary additional facts. See
Miller, supra note 38, at 1016 ("[A] Rule 12(b)(6) grant typically is with leave to replead .... );
see also, e.g., United States v. Union Corp., 194 F.R.D. 223, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("[A] district court
abuses its discretion when it dismisses a claim for want of sufficient factual allegations without
granting leave to amend and replead and without giving the pleading party an opportunity to cure
the factual deficiencies of the original pleading.").
95. See, e.g., Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 982-83 (10th Cir. 2002)
(reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence created factual dispute on issue of whether
defendant in ADA case had fifteen employees); see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999) (holding that § 1983 action seeking to vindicate
constitutional rights is action at law, to which jury right attaches, within meaning of Seventh
Amendment); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (holding that right to
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review on post-judgment motions and on appeal.97 Of course, to the
trial by jury applies to suits for treble damages under antitrust laws).
The jury right in Title VII claims for compensatory and punitive damages derives from statute,
not the Seventh Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2000) (providing jury trial on claims for
compensatory or punitive damages under Title VII). The statutory jury right was created by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, in the face of lower-court decisions refusing to find a constitutional jury
right in Title VII claims seeking back pay or front pay. See, e.g., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d
389, 398 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that remedy of front pay, being in lieu of reinstatement, is
equitable, and therefore does not carry with it jury trial right); Ramos v. Roche Prods., Inc., 936
F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Olin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 798 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986))
(holding that Title VII is "essentially equitable" in nature and does not carry with it right to trial by
jury); see also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974) (holding that jury trial right applies
to claims for compensatory damages under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, comparing
that statutory remedy to the more equitable remedy of Title VII).
The contours of the statutory jury right are the same as the constitutional jury right. Thus, in
Hemmings v. Tidyman's, Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1202 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit rejected the
argument that the cap on compensatory damages in § 1981a violated the statutory jury right;
because a damages cap would be constitutional under the Seventh Amendment, it was permissible
as to the statutory right. For our purposes, this means that a plaintiff who seeks compensatory
damages alone, or in addition to equitable remedies available under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(l) (enumerating available remedies, including injunctions, back pay, reinstatement,
"or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate"), may have a jury resolve issues of
whether the defendant is an employer under Title VII-that is, a person having fifteen or more
employees.
Although the jury right does not attach to claims for equitable relief, where a cause of action
includes both legal and equitable claims, common factual issues must be tried to and resolved by the
jury first. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 & n.8 (1962) (holding that "any legal
issues for which a trial by jury is timely and properly demanded [must] be submitted to a jury" and
"[als long as any legal cause is involved the jury rights it creates control"); Beacon Theatres, 359
U.S. at 510-11 ("[O]nly under the most imperative circumstances ... can the right to a jury trial of
legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims."); Moses, supra note 53, at
208-10. The question whether the defendant is an employer subject to the restrictions of Title VII
obviously is a common issue to a plaintiff's claims for both legal and equitable relief under the
statute-she cannot recover any remedy of any kind if the defendant is not subject to the statute.
Any disputes on the quantum-of-employees issue thus would be resolved by the jury as part of the
trial of the legal issues that comes first.
97. See U.S. CONST. art. Vii ("[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."); Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) ("The Seventh Amendment... bears not only on the
allocation of trial functions between judge and jury ... it also controls the allocation of authority to
review verdicts."); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 n.10 (1994) (describing some
verbal formulations of deferential review of jury verdicts, including whether verdict was governed
by "passion and prejudice," "gross excessiveness," and "against the great weight of the evidence");
Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 526-27 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing cases for proposition that
"in a federal civil case, by virtue of the Seventh Amendment, reviewing courts owe more deference
to a jury's findings than to findings by a judge"); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101,
108 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that jury verdict can be overturned "[o]nly if there is such a complete
absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of
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extent judges have become freer in resolving factual disputes, both in
granting summary judgment and in reviewing jury findings, the
procedural consequences of the jurisdiction/merits confusion may
become less practically significant.
98
Nevertheless, because different decision-makers often reach different
results on the same legal doctrine or on the same facts, the identity of the
decision-maker on an issue remains significant. 99 Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp.,100 the vehicle the Supreme Court should use in the October 2005
term to resolve Title VII's merits/jurisdiction confusion, illustrates the
point. The parties already had taken that sexual harassment case to trial,
where a jury awarded the plaintiff $40,000 in back pay and
compensatory and punitive damages.'0 ' After judgment was entered on
the verdict, defendants for the first time raised, and the court granted, a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground
that the defendant, by not having fifteen or more employees, was exempt
from Title VII's coverage.1
0 2
Of course, this occurred after the jury had concluded that the
defendant's real-world conduct violated Title VII. That conclusion
necessarily means the jury found that the defendant's conduct was
inconsistent with a duty imposed on it by Title VII. 103 This implicitly
means a finding that the defendant was an employer, otherwise it could
not have been subject to that statutory duty. The defendant raising the
fact after the eleventh hour, and the court resolving the dispute as a
sheer surmise and conjecture"); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, "I Lost at Trial-in the Court of
Appeals! ": The Expanding Power of the Federal Appellate Courts to Reexamine Facts, 38 HOuS. L.
REV. 1129, 1136 (2001) ("The Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause provides an express
constitutional guarantee against federal appellate court reexamination of jury findings."); Ellen E.
Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573,
583 (2003) (stating that Seventh Amendment only protects jury's fact-finding authority from review
by courts).
98. See supra notes 57, 96-97 and accompanying text. They remain significant as a formalist
matter, however. See infra Part III.B.
99. See LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note 92, at 1463.
100. 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, _ U.S. - (May 16, 2005) 125 S. Ct. 2246
(2005).
101. Id. at 222.
102. Id. Assuming quantum of employees is jurisdictional, as the Fifth Circuit held, the motion
was timely, even after judgment had been entered, because lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time in the process. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); supra notes 35-36.
103. See Harrison, supra note 17, at 2520 (defining wrongful conduct as that which is
inconsistent with duty resting on defendant); supra notes 64-88; infra Part lI.B.
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jurisdictional issue, together deprived the plaintiff of her right to a jury
determination (and a more favorable conclusion) on that fact. 104
Entanglement of jurisdiction and merits generates other procedural
anomalies. Consider, for example, the preclusive effect of a factual
finding. The jurisdictional dismissal in Arbaugh should be without
prejudice to the plaintiffs right to bring her Title VII claim in state
court.105 Under basic principles of claim preclusion, 10 6 a plaintiff can
refile in a proper forum, since the first judgment was based on the
absence of jurisdiction and was not on the merits. 07 However, the
defendant's status as an employer remains an essential element of the
plaintiffs claim; she can recover under Title VII in state court only if
she can show that an employer engaged in an unlawful employment
practice that caused her harm.10 8 And the federal court just found that
this particular defendant is not an employer within the meaning of the
statute.
This raises the related question of what issue-preclusive effect to give
to that finding. 09 Issue preclusion"O prohibits a party from relitigating a
factual issue actually found and necessary to an earlier judgment, where
the party had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue."' That
104. See supra notes 96-97.
105. See Idleman, Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 291-92; see also Yellow Freight
Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990) (holding that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to adjudicate Title VII claims).
106. Claim preclusion formerly was called res judicata, which also is the broad generic term used
for preclusion doctrine as a whole. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 n.5 (1980).
107. Preclusive effect attaches only to a judgment on the merits of a claim; if an action is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff remains able to refile her claims in an appropriate
judicial forum. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (providing that dismissal, other than for lack of
jurisdiction, operates as adjudication on merits); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985); Idleman, Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 291-92; Sisk, supra
note 93, at 695-96 n.650; see also Michael J. Edney, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and
Jurisdictional Dismissals after Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 193, 222 (2001) ("The court is aware
that a denial of jurisdiction still permits the litigants to find a proper forum."). Moreover, the
judgment has preclusive effect only if the rendering court had jurisdiction; the plaintiff in a second
lawsuit may rebut a claim-preclusion defense by collaterally challenging the jurisdiction of the first
court.
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); Storey v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 763-64
& n.l I (3d Cir. 2004).
109. See Mishkin, supra note 18, at 166 (arguing that even ifjurisdictional dismissal was not res
judicata, relitigation of fact would be barred by stare decisis effect of initial finding of fact).
110. Collateral estoppel under the old nomenclature. See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94 n.5.
11. See id. at 95; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979)
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basic principle would preclude the plaintiff in our scenario-who tried
and failed in federal court to establish that the defendant had fifteen
employees, an issue necessary to the earlier judgment of no federal
jurisdiction-from getting a second opportunity to prove that fact as part
of the merits of the same claim brought in state court.
112
Michael Edney correctly argues that applying issue preclusion in this
case would deny the plaintiff any opportunity to gain a full merits
determination on her federal claim in any court. 13 The same judicial
factual finding (the defendant has only twelve employees and thus is not
an employer under Title VII) defeats subject-matter jurisdiction in
federal court first, then defeats the merits in state court second. Such a
result upends the ordinary presumption that state courts should be
(emphasizing "obvious difference in position between a party who has never litigated an issue and
one who has fully litigated and lost").
112. Two cases appear to cut in the other direction. First, the Sixth Circuit expressly held that the
fact that a court took evidence for the purpose of deciding its jurisdiction does not mean its factual
findings are binding in future proceedings. See United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir.
1994). But the court supported its conclusion with cases and treatises asserting the basic proposition
that an actual determination of subject-matter jurisdiction has res judicata (in the sense of claim
preclusion) effect only on subject-matter jurisdiction, but does not preclude later litigation on the
merits of the same claim in an appropriate forum. See id. (citing Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 922 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990); Shaw v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 554 F.2d 786,
789 (6th Cir. 1977); CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1350, at 225 (1990)). In other words, the court relied on authority that only
establishes the uncontested proposition that if the first court actually decides whether or not it has
subject-matter jurisdiction, then the decision cannot be collaterally attacked in successive litigation.
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982) ("A party
that has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not, however,
reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment. It has long been the rule that
principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations-both subject matter and personal.")
(citations omitted); Da Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A] party that
has unsuccessfully litigated a court's subject matter jurisdiction is normally collaterally estopped
from such a subsequent challenge."). But this is a distinct point that in no way supports the Sixth
Circuit's broader conclusion that one fact actually litigated and found, applicable both to
jurisdiction and merits in different courts, can be relitigated.
In a second example, the Supreme Court held that a district court's denial of preliminary
injunctive relief under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) based on its determination that it
lacked NLRA statutory jurisdiction because the actions complained of did not affect interstate
commerce did not foreclose a plenary proceeding on the merits under the statute. NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 681-82 (1951). But that case did not involve
successive distinct litigation. The Court explicitly emphasized that the initial determination of no
effect on interstate commerce occurred in a preliminary proceeding for interlocutory relief
authorized by the statute, not intended to preclude a fuller opportunity to litigate the same claims in
detail in the same litigation. See id. at 682.
113. See Edney, supra note 107, at 216.
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available to adjudicate the merits of federal claims even when federal
courts are not.' 14 Edney's solution is special federal breclusion rules thatdecline to accord preclusive effect to facts or law found in jurisdictional
dismissals.1 15
Edney argues that jurisdiction generally is decided in proceedings
short of a full trial on the merits, a sufficiently different procedure that
may give parties less incentive to vigorously litigate the factual dispute
in federal court, knowing state court is available even after a loss. 116 Of
course, some federal jurisdiction is exclusive, such as over antitrust
claims.1 17 A plaintiff must know that a jurisdictional dismissal will
deprive her of any opportunity to recover under the Sherman Act,
providing all the incentive she needs to vigorously contest jurisdiction.
Issue preclusion ordinarily does not distinguish between a finding
made at trial and one made at a lesser pre-trial hearing. The analysis
begins and ends with whether the first proceeding provided a full and
fair opportunity to raise and litigate the issue and whether the issue was
found and necessary to the first judgment. For example, the Supreme
Court in Allen v. McCurry1 18 held that the trial judge's rejection of a
Fourth Amendment defense on a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence in
a state criminal case had issue-preclusive effect on a subsequent federal§ 1983 claim seeking damages for the same alleged Fourth Amendment
violation. 119
114. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990) ("Under our 'system ofdual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thuspresumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States."'(quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990))).
115. See Edney, supra note 107, at 195. Edney argues that
the preclusive effect ofjurisdictional dismissals-where a federal court has either found a lackof subject matter jurisdiction or explicitly deferred the question of its subject matterjurisdiction-should be confined to the precise question of the federal court's jurisdiction. Solimiting the preclusive effect would prevent federal courts from precluding litigation on the
merits ... in state courts ....
Id. See also Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001) (holding thatpreclusive effect of federal court judgments is question of federal law, content of which is dictated
by Court).
116. See Edney, supra note 107, at 221-22.
117. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379 (1985) ("[F]ederal
antitrust claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts."); Johnson v. NyackHosp., 964 F.2d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[F]ederal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal
antitrust lawsuits.").
118. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
119. See id. at 91-92, 105.
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A genuine procedural problem does flow from treating the same
finding of fact as jurisdictional in federal court and merits-related in
state court. The solution, however, is to better identify which facts
genuinely go to subject-matter jurisdiction and which genuinely are
elements of the substantive merits of a claim and to recognize them as
mutually exclusive categories. Courts thereby avoid any possible
preclusive effect. If quantum of employees in a federal employment
discrimination claim goes to the merits in state court, it also goes to
merits, not to subject-matter jurisdiction, in federal court and should be
adjudicated accordingly.
120
B. Formalist Consequences
The second problem with mixing jurisdictional facts and merits facts
is the resulting disregard for the formalist command to treat distinct legal
concepts in a distinct fashion. The "Court has largely maintained a clear
analytic distinction between jurisdiction, on the one hand, and two other
necessary components of a federal-court lawsuit: a cognizable cause of
action and the availability of an appropriate judicial remedy.'"12 1 As the
Court stated in Davis v. Passman,122 jurisdiction is a question of whether
a federal court has the constitutional or statutory power to hear a case, 23
while a substantive cause of action is a question of the "alleged invasion
of 'recognized legal rights' upon which a litigant bases his claim for
relief." ' 24 Jurisdiction is constitutional or congressional empowerment to
take cognizance of a cause of action-to examine whether some legal
120. See infra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
121. Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 1214 (emphasis in original); Edward Hartnett, The Standing of
the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers
in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2252 n.64 (1999) ("If a plaintiff fails to state a
cause of action (or, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim upon which relief can be
granted), the dismissal is on the merits, not for lack of jurisdiction."); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, _, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2754 (2004) (recognizing statute as jurisdictional,
empowering courts to hear limited category of substantive claims); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) ("It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as
opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts'
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.") (emphasis in original).
122. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
123. See id. at 239 n.18.
124. Id. at 237 (citations omitted); id. at 239 n.18 ("[Clause of action is a question of whether a
particular plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately
invoke the power of the court .... ") (emphasis in original).
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norm authorizes the bringing of that civil action and whether that legal
norm has been violated by events in the real world. Merits focus on
whether, in fact, that norm has been violated.
Evan Tsen Lee criticizes the formalist position by arguing that there is
no necessary difference between jurisdiction and merits, nothing that
categorically distinguishes jurisdiction questions from merits
questions. 125 According to Lee, both jurisdiction and merits "ultimately
have the same function-to tell us about the legitimacy of the resultingjudgment."'12 6 The presence of judicial jurisdiction and the presence of a
strong claim on the merits both create a presumption that a resultingjudgment is legitimate and should be obeyed. 127 Lee concludes that the
fact that jurisdiction and merits serve the same function explains why
courts have so much trouble identifying whether a question goes to one
or the other. 1
28
Lee's position generates several preliminary responses. First, the
divide between jurisdiction and merits corresponds to H.L.A. Hart's
divide between primary legal rules of obligation that control real-world
conduct and secondary legal rules that control the process of identifying
those primary rules and determining whether they have been violated. 129
Hart argued that a complex legal society (as opposed to a small, closely
knit pre-legal society) cannot function on primary rules alone, but
demands the introduction of secondary rules through which primary
rules are identified, discovered, and applied.1 30 For Hart, it is the
125. See Lee, supra note 4, at 1627; id. at 1614 ("[T]here is no hard conceptual difference
between jurisdiction and the merits .... [Tihe line between jurisdictional issues and merits issues is
always at some level arbitrary.").
126. Id. at 1624-25; id. at 1625 ("Jurisdiction and the merits both ultimately speak to the
resulting legitimacy ofjudgments ... ").
127. See id. at 1620-21. Lee describes it as a question of the pedigree of the judgment and of
tracing that judgment back to some legitimate authorization. In his view, however, it does not matter
whether the pedigree derives from some event or fact establishing the court's competence over the
parties or subject matter or whether the pedigree derives from the source of law truly creating a
cause of action. See id. at 1626.
128. See id. at 1625 ("[T]here is no bright line dividing these inquiries from one another, nor
could there be.").
129. See HART, supra note 19, at 91-92. Thanks to Lawrence Solum, and his Legal Theory Blog,
for this line of analysis. See Legal Theory Blog, http://www.lsolum.blogspot.com (Mar. 19, 2004,
05:21).
130. See HART, supra note 19, at 89-90 (arguing that only small, closely knit community could
live successfully by regime of primary rules alone, which instead must be supplemented in some
way); id. at 92 (describing "secondary rules" which "specify the ways in which the primary rules
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combination of primary and secondary rules that produces the "heart of a
legal system." 131  Of particular import are secondary "rules of
adjudication," which identify the individuals who will adjudicate,
articulate the rules to be followed in adjudicating, and confer status on
the declaration of breaches of primary-rule obligations.132 Jurisdictional
standards are examples of secondary rules of adjudication. 133 If both sets
of rules together form a fully functioning complex legal system, there
must be an analytic distinction between them.
Second, even if the ultimate purpose of merits and jurisdiction is the
same, the two concepts indisputably ask different questions. 1 34 As such,
we need different nomenclature simply to avoid confusion. 13
5 Jonathan
Siegel examines similar confusion created by judicial application of the
political question doctrine 136 in two distinct and unrelated situations.
Siegel argues that courts properly utilize the doctrine in cases in which
they stay their hand even though the defendant's actions were unlawful,
but courts improperly refer to the doctrine in the distinct case in which a
plaintiff should lose simply because she has not stated reasons why the
defendant's challenged actions are unlawful.
137
The line between merits and jurisdiction can be drawn in a similar
manner. 138 Merits ask whether the defendant's conduct was legally
may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation
conclusively determined").
131. Id. at 95.
132. See id. at 94-95.
133. See Wells, supra note 29, at 684 (arguing that secondary rules "merely determine the forums
in which conflicting claims regarding rights and obligations defined by other bodies of law may be
adjudicated").
134. See Lee, supra note 4, at 1626 ("[Tlhere is obviously a difference between asking whether
all plaintiffs are diverse from all defendants and asking whether the defendant was negligent.")
(footnotes omitted).
135. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Political Questions and Political Remedies 15 (George Washington
Univ. Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 93, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 5 2 7 2 6 4 .
136. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
137. See Siegel, supra note 135, at 15; see also id. at 5 ("To the extent the [political question]
doctrine calls for dismissal of cases because defendants' actions are legally unconstrained, it does
no work at all.") (emphasis in original); id. at 6-8 (criticizing lower courts for invoking political
question doctrine where complaint was obviously frivolous because plaintiffs had not alleged that
federal government had done anything wrong).
138. Particularly because a court invoking what Siegel calls the "real political question doctrine"
will dismiss the case for lack of Article III jurisdiction. See Siegel, supra note 135, at 5.
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constrained (by the Constitution or by act of Congress); jurisdiction asks
whether a federal court has the power to enforce that legal constraint on
the defendant's conduct. We do not need jurisdictional rules to tell us
that when a plaintiff challenges conduct that is not legally constrained,
the plaintiff loses: "[c]ommon sense and Rule 12(b)(6) tell us that."' 139
Jurisdictional doctrines "must do more than merely duplicate the concept
of dismissal for failure to state a claim."'140 Otherwise, every action
brought under federal law would turn into a question of jurisdiction; all
dismissals would be jurisdictional and no federal claims ever would be
dismissed or defeated on the merits. ' 4'
Most importantly, even if there is no inherent or essential difference
between the concepts, Lee acknowledges that we must recognizejurisdiction as a creation of positive law:
To put it crudely, if the legislature says there is such a thing asjurisdiction, then judges and lawyers are to act as if there is such
a thing as jurisdiction. If the legislature says that questions of
subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved before any other
issue in the litigation, then judges and lawyers should comply as
a simple matter of legislative supremacy. 42
For Lee, jurisdiction and merits are distinct only to the extent that the
legislature and good public policy make them worth treating distinctly.
For our purposes, Congress has made them distinct and courts must
respect that distinction. 43 Relevant positive law establishes that there is
a cause of action, there is jurisdiction, and the two must be handled
differently. 44 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codify differences,
creating different motions to dismiss and establishing different waiver
rules for each. 45 The Supreme Court has, at least in the abstract, sought
139. Id.
140. Id.; see also Lee, supra note 4, at 1627 n.48 (describing argument that "jurisdictional
questions ask only 'should the court proceed?' whereas merits questions ask 'who should win?').
141. See Clermont, supra note 18, at 4 ("Yet we also know that the plaintiff should not have to
prove her cause of action in order to establish jurisdiction ....") (emphasis in original); Mishkin,
supra note 18, at 166.
142. Lee, supra note 4, at 1629; see id. at 1627 (arguing that nothing prevents legislature from
tying jurisdictional inquiry to equities, just as nothing prevents legislature from divorcing liability
rule from equities); Steinman, supra note 31, at 873 (emphasizing overlap that often exists between
procedural questions and merits).
143. See supra Part IlI.A.
144. See supra Part I.
145. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), with id. 12(b)(6); compare id. 12(h)(2) ("A defense of
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to maintain a line between them, recognizing that "failure to state a
proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits ... not for
dismissal for want of jurisdiction.' 46 And a court should conclusively
establish the existence of Article III jurisdiction at the first phase before
considering whether the plaintiff has a claim or who should win at the
second and third.1
47
The touchstone of the formalist analysis is a proper conception of
Congress's constitutional powers and the positive law created by the
exercise of those powers. John Harrison proffers a model under which
Congress possesses four legislative powers falling in two broad
categories. There are structural powers to determine the jurisdiction of
the federal courts by deciding what lawsuits Article III courts can
hear,148 and to determine what kinds of decrees courts can issue in
lawsuits within that jurisdiction. 149 And there are substantive powers
with which Congress "can create, decline to create, or limit causes of
action"; pithily, this is the power to "determine who is entitled to sue
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted... may be made in any pleading
permitted ... or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits."), with id.
12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."). See also Da Silva v. Kinsho
Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 2000) ("These consequences suggest that the institutional
requirements of a judicial system weigh in favor of narrowing the number of facts or circumstances
that determine subject matter jurisdiction.").
146. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
523 U.S. 83, 96 (1998) ("[T]he nonexistence of a cause of action was no proper basis for a
jurisdictional dismissal."); id. at 89 (holding that jurisdiction "is not defeated ... by the possibility
that the averments might fail to state a cause of action" (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 682)); Idleman,
Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 295 ("[W]hether a cause of action exists is not a
jurisdictional issue as such.").
147. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 92; Idleman, Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 243
(describing principle that "a court should first confirm the existence of... jurisdiction... before
tackling the merits of a controverted case." (quoting Bemer v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 23 (1 st Cir.
1997))).
148. Harrison, supra note 17, at 2514.
149. See id. Harrison limits the second structural power to defining remedies that will be
available in cases that do not involve causes of action created by Congress, namely constitutional
claims. See id. Compare John T. Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and
Civil Rights Litigation After Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REv. 733, 788 (2005) ("Congress can
modify the remedies available for violations of constitutional rights."), with Tracy A. Thomas,
Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVlS L. REV. 673, 703 (2001) (arguing
that derivative theory of Congress's power to establish remedies "does not justify the legislating of
remedies for constitutional violations for which Congress does not have power over the definitional
guarantee").
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whom, for what, and for what remedy."' 5° Congress has substantive
power to enforce constitutional rules both against States and state actors
and to prohibit the conduct of private individuals.' 5'
Harrison illustrates the point about congressional power by showing
the distinct laws enacted pursuant to the exercise of distinct powers:
Congress exercises a structural power when it describes the
circumstances under which injunctions will be available in
diversity cases not involving federal substantive law. In contrast,
Congress exercises a substantive power when it creates a cause
of action under the Post Office Clause and entitles the plaintiff
to double damages.1
52
James Leonard offers a different illustration of the same point:
Congress might execute a treaty with France forbidding cargo
inspections in American ports by a statute that authorizes the
federal district courts to hear claims relating to the treaty and
specifically permitting private citizens to seek injunctive relief
against state harbor officials. Such a statute would meet the
criteria of enabling the lower courts to hear a species of "arising
under" cases and of providing a claim against a state official. 5 3
Congress exercises substantive power in creating a cause of action,
recognizable by language directed to individuals and dictating the terms
of their primary conduct. A cause of action is framed in terms of the
rights and obligations of real-world actors, setting forth the
circumstances in which one individual will be deemed to have ignored
or contradicted her obligations or in which her conduct will be deemed
to have violated the rights of another. 154 According to Anthony Bellia,
150. Harrison, supra note 17, at 2515; see also Leonard, supra note 31, at 280 ("Congress'
substantive authority to legislate within its constitutional ambit entails the power to create or to
refuse to create causes of action. It may therefore choose who is entitled to enforce a claim in court,
and, equally important, who may not."); Thomas, supra note 149, at 704 ("Congress, therefore, does
have authority to dictate remedies for statutory rights. This remedial power derives from the
legislature's authority to define the substantive statutory guarantee."); id. at 696 (describing "non-
shocking conclusion that where Congress has created the statutory right it may also create the
statutory remedy").
15 1. See Harrison, supra note 17, at 2513.
152. Id. at 2514.
153. Leonard, supra note 3 1, at 289; see also id. at 280 ("Legislative power over claims is most
obvious when dealing with statutory rights.").
154. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that questions of substantive law turn on whether, in enacting statute, Congress asserted
regulatory power over challenged conduct); Leonard, supra note 3 1, at 280.
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the conception of cause of action reflected in the Federal Rules is that of
Judge Charles Clark, the Rules' primary drafter:
Clark argued that a cause of action consisted simply of "an
aggregate of operative facts, a series of acts or events, which
gives rise to one or more legal relations of right-duty
enforceable in the courts." In Clark's view, one had a cause of
action if one was entitled to some remedy generally, rather than
to the particular remedy available through a form of action.
5 5
This conception of cause of action demands allegations and proof that
"the defendant's conduct was wrongful (inconsistent with a duty resting
on the defendant) and that the plaintiff is within the category of persons
entitled to judicial relief because of the wrongful conduct."'156 For
example, Congress created a cause of action in enacting Title VII,
asserting regulatory authority over employee relations of private
employers of a certain size engaged in certain businesses. The statute
details the conduct prohibited, 57 the real-world actors protected, 58 the
real-world actors obligated to act (or to refrain from acting) in certain
ways, 159 and the consequences of the failure to adhere to the terms of the
law, including the remedies available to the aggrieved party. 60
Similarly, Congress created a cause of action in § 1983 through which a
plaintiff can plead, prove, and recover on constitutional claims against
state and local governments and government officials.'16 The statute
incorporates the underlying constitutional right, privilege, or immunity
secured; 62 together they detail the conduct prohibited, the real-world
actors protected, the real-world actors subject to obligations, and what a
155. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause ofAction, 89 IOWA L. REv. 777, 796 (2004)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
156. Harrison, supra note 17, at 2520-21.
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (defining "unlawful employment practice").
158. See id. § 2000e(f) (defining employee).
159. See id. § 2000e(a)-(e).
160. See id. § 2000e-5(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State ... subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities,
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable ... for redress ....
Id.
162. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e must first
determine whether the officer's alleged conduct violated a constitutional right.").
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plaintiff must prove to recover a remedy.' 63
On the other hand, Congress exercises its structural powers, for our
purposes, through jurisdiction-granting statutes. A jurisdictional grant
speaks in explicitly jurisdictional terms or refers explicitly to the
jurisdiction of the courts.164 The statutory language addresses federal
courts, rather than the individuals whose primary conduct is regulated.165
The two categories of enactments are linked. Jurisdictional grants
empower courts to hear and resolve cases brought before them by
parties; substantive causes of action grant parties permission to bring
those cases before the court. The substantive cause of action is a ticket
permitting individuals to enter the federal judicial process; jurisdiction
empowers the court to punch the ticket. Both are necessary for a civil
action to be litigated.
Congress exercises its structural powers to establish jurisdiction on an
163. See, e.g., id. (holding that plaintiff could not allege violation of Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination when he never was prosecuted for crime nor compelled to be witness
against himself in criminal case); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 855 (1998)
(holding that, where defendants' conduct did not violate Fourteenth Amendment because it did not
"shock the conscience," defendants could not be called upon to answer for that conduct under
§ 1983); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986) (stating that § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that defendant had requisite state of mind where underlying procedural due process right contains
state-of-mind requirement).
Harrison argues that the Fourteenth Amendment is not judicially self-enforcing; instead, the
amendment was drafted on the assumption that it would be for Congress to decide when state-level
majorities had defied the national consensus and how much additional enforcement was necessary.
See Harrison, supra note 17, at 2522-23. Daniel Meltzer suggests that this argument means "if
Congress had never enacted § 1983 or other federal civil rights statutes, Brown v. Board of
Education might well have been dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: no federal remedy would
have existed." Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.
2537, 2551 (1998) (emphasis added). Meltzer takes the view, in other words, that absence of § 1983
would have defeated the Brown plaintiffs' claims on the merits, not because federal courts would
have lacked jurisdiction.
164. See Zipes v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (holding that exhaustion
of administrative remedies requirement is not jurisdictional, where provision "does not speak in
jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts"); United
Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 955 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wood, D., J.,
dissenting); Idleman, Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 324 n.366.
165. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(3) ("Each United States district court.., shall have jurisdiction of actions brought
under" Title VII); see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 344 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(calling jurisdictional language "most salient characteristic of jurisdictional statutes"); Idleman,
Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 324 n.366. (discussing import ofjurisdictional language
in characterizing a statute).
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understanding that extant or future statutes enacted under its substantive
powers or extant or future common law rules provide a cause of action
that federal courts now are empowered to hear. The Supreme Court
adopted this understanding in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.166 The Sosa
Court interpreted the Alien Tort Statute 67 as a jurisdictional grant to
federal courts.' 68 In response to the argument that this interpretation
meant that the statute was "stillborn" when enacted because it did not
also establish a cause of action, 169 the Court stated that federal Common
Law in existence in 1789, incorporating principles of international law
and the law of nations, provided the applicable substantive law for the
actions that federal courts had been empowered to adjudicate. 170
Conversely, when Congress exercises its substantive power by
creating a statutory cause of action, it should be understood as exercising
its concomitant structural power to grant jurisdiction to federal courts
(whether exclusively 171 or concurrently with state courts 172 ) to hear and
resolve claims arising under that statute, absent a clear statutory
declaration to the contrary. 173 The significance of statutory general
166. 542 U.S. 692, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) ("[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.").
168. Sosa, 542 U.S. at -, 124 S. Ct. at 2755; William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary
International Law in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L LAW 87, 93 (2005). But see Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A
Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 167 (describing Court's
approach as "jurisdictional-but-not-jurisdictional interpretation of the [Alien Tort Statute]").
169. SeeSosa, 542 U.S. at _, 124 S. Ct. at 2755.
170. See id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2761; Dodge, supra note 168, at 98. But see Ku & Yoo, supra
note 168, at 199 (arguing for functional analysis, under which ATS would be read "as a
jurisdictional statute that does not authorize federal courts to engage in the development and
enforcement of any kind of [customary international law] as part of their common lawmaking
powers").
171. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379 (1985) ("[F]ederal
antitrust claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts."); Johnson v. Nyack
Hosp., 964 F.2d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[Flederal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal
antitrust lawsuits.").
172. See Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts,
Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 171, 249 (1995) ("Much of
federal jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the state courts and has been since the inception of the
country."); see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) (emphasizing different but
concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts).
173. See Mishkin, supra note 18, at 159 ("[I]t is desirable that Congress be competent to bring to
an initial national forum all cases in which the vindication of federal policy may be at stake."); see
also United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 955 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
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federal question jurisdiction 174  is that when Congress enacts a
substantive law, federal district courts immediately and necessarily
attain jurisdiction to hear claims under that statute, without Congress
having to do anything more. The authority lasts unless and until
Congress affirmatively divests that jurisdiction.
Further, Congress's substantive powers are broader and more
discretionary than its structural powers. 175 The default therefore should
be that Congress has exercised its broader, more frequently utilized
substantive power, unless the clear statutory language shows that it is
structural, notably by speaking in terms to the federal courts about their
subject-matter jurisdiction. 176
IV. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS AND MERITS FACTS:
EXPLAINING CONFUSION
Whether courts should treat particular factual elements as
jurisdictional, and whether differential treatment of some facts under the
same statute is justified, may turn on the purpose of particular statutory
elements. The question, then, is why Congress chooses to narrow
particular statutory causes of action. Why are Title VII and other
employment discrimination statutes limited to businesses with a
minimum number of employees? Why does § 1983 reach only
defendants who act under color of state law? Why does the Sherman Act
reach only restraints of trade affecting interstate commerce? We can
review several explanations, but none justifies treating some elements
differently from other elements in the same federal statute. And none
justifies treating any of these facts as going to federal subject-matter
(Wood, D., J., dissenting) (emphasizing need for "clear congressional statement that it is intended to
restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts").
174. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (granting district courts original jurisdiction "of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"); Leonard, supra note 31, at
277 (arguing that § 1331 supplies jurisdictional basis for large number of federal statutory and
constitutional cases); infra Part V.A.
175. See Harrison, supra note 17, at 2514 ("Congress has considerably more discretion when
exercising substantive rather than structural power.").
176. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 955, 964 (Wood, D., J., dissenting) (arguing that
because statute does not contain clear congressional statement that it is aimed at jurisdiction and
does not even mention word "jurisdiction," enactment is substantive and not jurisdictional); Da
Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he institutional requirements of a
judicial system weigh in favor of narrowing the number of facts or circumstances that determine
subject matter jurisdiction.").
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jurisdiction.
A. Jurisdictional Elements
One explanation is that a particular issue is a "jurisdictional
element"-a fact included in a statute that must be pled and proven by
the plaintiff in each case, serving as a nexus between a particular piece
of legislation and Congress's constitutional power to enact that
legislation and to regulate the conduct at issue.' 77 Title VII and other
federal anti-discrimination statutes have been enacted and upheld as
exercises of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. 178 The
business regulated must have an effect on interstate commerce, 179 a
requirement usually satisfied where the defendant's conduct can be
characterized as part of a class of commercial or economic activity. 8°
177. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (striking down Violence Against
Women Act because it "contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of
action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce"); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (describing need for jurisdictional elements that "would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the [conduct] in question affects interstate commerce"); Da Silva
v. Kinsho Int'l. Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing "disputes as to the existence of
a fact that is essential to a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate"); see also Adler
& Dorf, supra note 14, at 1153 ("Congress sometimes chooses to include in its statutes a
'jurisdictional nexus'-that is, a requirement that the government prove that the acts to which a
statute is applied in a given case themselves affect interstate commerce.").
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress debated whether the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was an
exercise of the commerce power or the enforcement power of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and expressly relied on both as its source of power. See Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel,
110 YALE L.J. 441,494 (2000). It was the Court that looked almost exclusively to the former power,
in part to avoid the sticky problem of whether to recognize congressional power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment against private actors. Id. at 494-95; see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241,258 (1964) ("[lf it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does
not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.") (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
179. See Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 81 (3d Cir. 2003) ("Because Congress
enacted Title VII under its Commerce Clause power, . . . the requirement that an employer be 'in an
industry affecting commerce' is the statute's constitutional basis."); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at
614 (stating that whether "particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a
legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court" (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557
n.2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J., concurring)))). In addition to the
quantum-of-employee threshold, the employment discrimination statutes all define employer as an
entity engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (Title
VII); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2000) (ADEA); 29 U.S.C. § 261 l(4)(A)(i) (2000) (FMLA).
180. See Gonzalez v. Raich, _ U.S. _ _ (June 6, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2195. 2205 (2005)
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Similarly, the Sherman Act by its terms reaches only contracts or
agreements in restraint of commerce among the several states, linking
the prohibited conduct to congressional authority over interstate
commerce.' 8 1 The under-color-of-law element in § 1983 serves a similar
nexus function by linking the statute to Congress's power under Section
5 to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights, which by their
terms only prohibit action by states.'
8 2
1. Recognizing Jurisdictional Elements
The jurisdictional-element argument as to employment discrimination
statutes is that quantum of employees functions as a proxy for effect on
interstate commerce. Companies with fifteen or more employees are
(describing "Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class
of activities"'); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (striking down statute that "by its terms has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise"); see also Adler & Doff, supra note 14, at
1152 ("Whether Congress has acted within the scope of the Commerce Clause depends upon
whether the law Congress enacted regulates either the channels or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce or classes of economic activities that, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect
interstate commerce.") (emphasis in original); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking
the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations But
Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 107 (1999) ("[T]he Commerce
Clause establishes two distinct requirements: Congress must (1) regulate "commerce" (2) that
implicates commerce in more than one state.").
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232,
242 (1980) ("To establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act violation it would be
sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce generated by
respondents' brokerage activity."); see also Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1153.
182. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."); id. § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."). See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936
(1982) ("As a matter of substantive constitutional law the state-action requirement reflects judicial
recognition of the fact that 'most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against
infringement by governments."' (quoting Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978)));
Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, 816 F.2d 895, 898 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[T]he state action
requirement of a § 1983 claim constitutes a basis for Congress to regulate conduct pursuant to § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 ("Foremost among these
limitations [on Section 5 power] is the time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by
its very terms, prohibits only state action."); Post & Siegel, supra note 178, at 455 (arguing that
limitations on Commerce Clause have reemphasized importance of congressional Section 5 power,
which in turn has been limited by recent decisions demanding state action); Wasserman, supra note
84, at 837-38 n.213 (arguing that § 1983 as used in constitutional claims enforces what Constitution
already prohibits).
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large enough that their business activities presumptively affect interstate
commerce, while smaller companies with fewer than fifteen employees
presumptively do not.' 83 On this understanding, Congress limited Title
VII only to larger companies because it lacked constitutional power to
regulate the employment practices of smaller companies because such
companies' conduct inherently did not affect commerce. But this
argument fails.
No one who supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964 asserted this
proxy theory as the basis of congressional power to enact the statute.
The only mention appears in the Separate Minority Report from the
House Judiciary Committee, prepared by Representatives Poff and
Cramer. They sharply criticized, and argued against the constitutionality
of, Title VII for proceeding upon a theory "that the quantum of
employees is a rational yardstick by which the interstate commerce
concept can be measured."' 184 Worse, they argued, "[o]ut of thin air, the
bill pulls a figure and determines that 25 employees is the magic
number-not 26 or 24 but 25. ''I85 But it is not clear that this was, in fact,
the theory of federal substantive power on which supporters of the bill
relied.
186
Moreover, the language and evolution of Title VII destroys the
jurisdictional-element argument, as the Third Circuit demonstrated in the
most thorough and detailed analysis of this issue. First, Title VII defines
"employer" as a company that is both "engaged in an industry affecting
commerce" and "has fifteen or more employees."' 87 If quantum of
employees truly is a proxy for effect on commerce, the second part of
183. See Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 81 ("[O]ne might read the fifteen-employee threshold as reflecting
Congress's determination that only those companies with fifteen or more employees have the
requisite substantial effect on interstate commerce to permit Congress to enact the statute.").
184. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 26 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES
VII AND Xl OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2095, 2108 (1964) (Separate Minority Views of Hon.
Richard H. Poffand Hon. William Cramer).
185. Id.
186. See Post & Siegel, supra note 178, at 494-95.
On the level of formal constitutional discourse, however, the constitutional debates
surrounding the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 revolved around the question of
whether the statute should be enacted as an exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce or instead of its Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Eventually
Congress split the difference and drafted the statute to rely upon both the Commerce Clause
and upon Section 5.
Id.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000); see Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 82.
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the definition renders the first superfluous: a company that meets the
employee threshold necessarily affects commerce. But that is not how
Title VII is understood; a putative employer with twenty employees still
is not bound by Title VII if not operating in an industry affecting
commerce. 188 The use of two prongs to define employer suggests that
Congress intended Title VII to reach only a subset of potential
employers that it could have regulated-those whose businesses affect
commerce, but only if of a certain size.18 9
Second, the Third Circuit points out that the evolution of the
quantum-of-employee element defeats its constitutional significance.
Congress lowered the threshold from twenty-five to fifteen in the 1972
amendments to Title VII. 9° It is illogical that the number of employees
that substantially affect commerce should drop in only eight years.19'
Also, the 1972 amendment as originally proposed in both the House and
Senate sought to lower the threshold all the way to eight employees;
fifteen was a political compromise with those who wanted to maintain
the threshold at twenty-five.192 The fluctuation of the threshold suggests
that Congress was not linking it to Commerce Clause considerations, but
to policy concerns regarding the extent of federal law. 19 3
Finally, the suggestion that quantum of employees is a jurisdictional
element of an employment discrimination claim-that Congress was
constitutionally limited to regulating only employers of a particular
size-fails as a matter of substantive Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
At the time of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Wickard v. Filburn,194 a
New Deal-era Commerce Clause case, was at its zenith in empowering
188. See Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 82.
189. See 110 CONG. REC. S. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (arguing that Title VII is
constitutional because coverage is limited to businesses and organizations affecting commerce).
190. See Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 82.
191. See id.
192. See id.; Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336-37 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1983); see also STAFF
OF SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE S. COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1283 (Comm.
Print 1972) (statement of Sen. Cotton) (criticizing effort to lower employee-number requirement).
193. See Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 82; infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
194. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Filburn upheld the application of federal crop quotas against an
individual farmer who grew wheat largely for use on his farm and not for sale in the interstate
market. See id. at 114, 129; Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation,
and Congressional Power over Commerce, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 83 (Michael C. Dorf
ed., 2004).
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Congress to regulate an individual actor whose conduct, aggregated with
the conduct of other actors similarly situated, had a substantial enough
effect on interstate commerce.' 95 As Jim Chen argues, "[t]hanks to
Filburn, Congress may reach any economic actor 'trivial by itself as
long as its 'contribution' to the national economy, 'taken together with
that of many other[]' actors 'similarly situated, is far from trivial. iql%
Congress has acted on that understanding of its commerce power since
1964.197 And any recent narrowing of the Commerce Clause 198 has not
changed this understanding. The aggregation model would support
federal prohibitions on employment discrimination by small companies,
even companies with one employee, whose business, together with other
similar businesses, involve economic activities that substantially affect
commerce. 
199
195. See Chen, supra note 194, at 94-95 ("The decisions upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as a proper exercise of Congress's commerce power.., did little more than reaffirm the New Deal's
Commerce Clause sequence."); Post & Siegel, supra note 178, at 447 ("[W]hen the Supreme Court
came to determine the Act's constitutionality... it ... chose instead to build on the case law of the
New Deal settlement, which ceded very broad powers to Congress to legislate under the Commerce
Clause.").
196. Chen, supra note 194, at 97-98 (quoting Filburn, 317 U.S. at 127-28); see also United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 637 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing period after Filburn
as "a period in which the law enjoyed a stable understanding that congressional power under the
Commerce Clause ... extended to all activity that, when aggregated, has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce").
197. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that understanding that
aggregation of local activities was permissible "was secure even against the turmoil at the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"); Post & Siegel, supra note 178, at 451 ("In the past thirty years,
Congress has exercised its commerce authority to develop a rich and complex jurisprudence of
federal antidiscrimination legislation, which is in many of its particulars in tension with judicial
enforcement of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 301 (1964) ("[W]e must conclude that while the focus of the legislation was on the
individual restaurant's relation to interstate commerce, Congress appropriately considered the
importance of that connection with the knowledge that the discrimination was but 'representative of
many others throughout the country, the total incidence of which if left unchecked may well become
far-reaching in its harm to commerce."' (quoting Polish Nat'l Alliance of U.S. v. NLRB, 322 U.S.
643, 648 (1944))).
198. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995). But
see Gonzales v. Raich, _ U.S. _, - (June 6, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211, 2215 (2005)
(distinguishing Morrison and Lopez and upholding federal statute prohibiting possession and use of
even intrastate noncommercially cultivated marijuana).
199. See Calvin Massey, Congressional Power to Regulate Sex Discrimination: The Effect of the
Supreme Court's "New Federalism," 55 ME. L. REV. 63, 66 (2003) (arguing that Morrison and
Lopez "have little impact on congressional power to regulate workplace sex discrimination");
Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 180, at 125 (arguing that virtually all federal labor and employment
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2. Understanding the Effects of True Jurisdictional Elements
To the extent confusion of jurisdiction and merits derives from
misapprehension of the meaning and effect of jurisdictional elements,
concluding that the quantum-of-employee threshold in Title VII is not ajurisdictional element does not alone eliminate the confusion. Statutes
contain true jurisdictional elements ("affecting commerce" under Title
VII or the Sherman Act or "action under color" of state law under§ 1983) linking the regulated conduct to the appropriate substantive
congressional power.2 00 Courts avoid the confusion of jurisdiction and
merits only by understanding the real purpose and effect of jurisdictional
elements.
Jurisdictional elements are about congressional jurisdiction-
substantive congressional constitutional power or authority-to regulate
particular real-world conduct through legislation. Jurisdictional elements
have nothing to do with judicial jurisdiction-judicial power or
authority-to adjudicate a case or controversy between parties under that
statute .2 0 For example, in striking down the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) in United States v. Morrison,z0 z the Supreme Court
emphasized Congress's failure to include jurisdictional elements in the
regulations remain valid because "so long as Congress is regulating a commercial transaction, it is
immaterial whether there is some other legislative purpose (even an overriding one)"); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L.
REv. 1185, 1211 (2003) (arguing that federal statutes addressing employment regulate "the
compensated rendering of services"); Post & Siegel, supra note 178, at 449 ("[T]he present Courtdoes not seem inclined to attack Heart of Atlanta by holding that federal regulation of
discrimination in ... employment involves matters that are 'noneconomic' or 'truly local."'); see
also Raich, - U.S. at -, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (defining economics as relating to production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities).
200. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1153.
201. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)(arguing that "'legislative jurisdiction' .. . refers to 'the authority of a state to make its law
applicable to persons or activities,' and is quite a separate matter from 'jurisdiction to adjudicate')(citations omitted); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 953 (7th Cir. 2003)(en banc) (Wood, D., J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for failing to "distinguish[] carefully
between judicial and legislative jurisdiction--or, to put it differently, between jurisdiction to decide
a case and jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law"); Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, 816 F.2d
895, 898 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[I]t is important to distinguish elements of a claim that relate to
Congress's jurisdiction, i.e., its constitutional authority to act, from issues that relate to thejurisdiction of the courts."); Calkins, supra note 78, at 633 ("[S]ome courts clearly err, seemingly
using the term [jurisdiction] accurately and yet treating interstate commerce issues as normally
jurisdictional.").
202. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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statute. Private acts of non-employment-related gender-motivated
violence are not regulable under the Commerce Clause because they are
non-economic 20 3 and they do not implicate a state or state actor as
required for an exercise of Section 5 power.204 The basic point
underlying Morrison was that Congress lacked substantive power to
enact VAWA-to create a federal right to be free from private acts of
non-commercial gender-motivated violence or to impose a federal
obligation to refrain from such acts.
Congress's substantive power-granting provisions operate as what
Matthew Adler and Michael Dorf label "constitutional existence
conditions"-a federal right actually exists and becomes enforceable as
law only if it falls within the scope of some substantive regulatory
205power. After Morrison, suing in federal court to enforce the rights
created by VAWA against a private individual would be no different
than suing to enforce a right that Congress never enacted into law.206
Adler and Dorf argue that the
constitutional (existence) question is whether the statute
contains a jurisdictional nexus. Whether the nexus is satisfied in
particular circumstances is a distinct question about the statute's
scope to be decided only once the statute's existence has been
established. 0 7
In other words, whether the plaintiff pleads and proves the jurisdictional
element in a given case is a subconstitutional question of statutory
interpretation-a question of the reach, scope, and application of a
constitutionally valid statute to a particular set of facts. Of course,
203. See id. at 613-14 (criticizing lack of ties between VAWA and regulation of interstate
commerce).
204. See id. at 625-26. But see id. at 664 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress could act
to provide federal remedy where states have failed, through discriminatory conduct, to provide
adequate remedies in certain areas); Post & Siegel, supra note 178, at 501 (arguing that Court's
1960s anti-discrimination decisions "decisively freed federal antidiscrimination legislation from the
state action requirement it preserved for its own Section 1 cases"); id. at 501-02 ("By the end of
[the 1960s], Congress, the Court, and the American people all expected the federal government to
lead the fight against discrimination in the public and private sectors. This is the momentous fact
that Morrison ignores .... ").
205. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1119.
206. See id. at 1129 (describing requirements of Article 1, Section 7 for enacting legislation-
bicameralism and presentment to the President-as obvious examples of provisions that constitute
"the difference between law and nonlaw").
207. Id. at 1153 (emphasis in original).
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whether the plaintiff pleads and proves any element of a claim is a sub-
constitutional question of the reach, scope, and application of a
constitutionally valid statute to a particular set of facts. Statutory
elements determine whether the defendant's conduct was inconsistent
with a statutorily imposed duty and whether the plaintiff is within the
category of persons entitled to relief because of that conduct. °8
For example, an employment-discrimination plaintiffs failure to
establish a true jurisdictional element-that the defendant is engaged in
a business affecting interstate commerce-means only that the statute by
its terms does not reach the real-world actors and conduct at issue in that
case. ° 9 But in the same way, the plaintiffs failure to prove any
element-that she is an employee (as opposed to an independent
contractor210), that she is a member of the statutorily protected class, 211
208. See Harrison, supra note 17, at 2520-21.
209. See Johnson v. Apna Ghar, Inc., 330 F.3d 999, 1001-02 (7th Cir. 2003).
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000) ("The term 'employee' means an individual employed by
an employer .... ); 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (2000) (ADEA) (same); EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that, in order to show ADEA violation, plaintiff
must establish that adversely affected individuals were employees); Farlow v. Wachovia Bank of
N.C., N.A., 259 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of summary judgment based on
determination that plaintiff in Title VII action was independent contractor, not employee); Garcia v.
Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1267 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (holding that there was genuine
issue of material fact precluding summary judgment as to whether plaintiff is employee or
independent contractor).
Independent contractors can bring race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000),
which prohibits discrimination in the "making and enforcing" of contracts, including contracts of
employment or contracts for personal services. See Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d
8, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1981 permits claims by employees and corporate
independent contractors against another corporation, provided there is contractual relationship
between plaintiff and defendant). But § 1981 does not allow for claims based on discrimination or
harassment because of sex or other characteristics.
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (defining "disability" as "physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual"); id.§ 12111(8) (defining "qualified person with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires"); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
184, 198 (2002) ("[T]o be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have
an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives. The impairment's impact must also be permanent or
long term."); id. at 187 (reversing summary judgment on this point); Storey v. Bums Int'l Sec.
Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 766 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica, C.J., concurring) (arguing that plaintiff who
described himself as "Confederate Southern-American" had not established himself as member of
protected legitimate national-original classification for Title VII purposes); Marinelli v. City of Erie,
216 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that plaintiff must establish that she is qualified person
with disability in order to state cognizable cause of action under ADA).
Jurisdiction and Merits
212
that she actually suffered an adverse employment action, or that the
adverse employment action was because of some prohibited reason
rather than for cause 213-means only that the statute by its terms does
not reach (or subject to sanction) the real-world actors and conduct at
issue. Similarly, a Sherman Act plaintiffs failure to plead and prove the
jurisdictional element of a substantial effect on non-foreign interstate
commerce yields the same result as failure to prove the ordinary
statutory element that the contract unlawfully restrained trade. The Act
does not reach (or subject to sanction) the real-world actors or the
214
conduct at issue.
Perhaps Congress limited the statutes to persons affecting interstate
commerce for different reasons than it limited the statutes only to certain
employment practices or certain restraints of trade. Congress demands
an effect on commerce to ensure the constitutionality of the statute,
while it narrows the range of actionable restraints on trade simply as a
policy choice.215
But the effects of non-satisfaction of any element are identical: the
plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of the statute's terms on these
facts. The procedural treatment of each statutory element, whether a
jurisdictional element or otherwise, should be identical. The judgment in
all cases is that the statute was not violated in the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence at issue and the defendant prevails on the statutory
merits-on 12(b)(6), summary judgment, or following trial, depending
on whether the fact had been in genuine issue.216
212. See, e.g., Storey, 390 F. 3d at 764 (affirming dismissal of claim in which plaintiff failed to
plead that he suffered adverse employment action).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (defining unlawful employment practices as adverse job action
because of protected characteristic); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (defining unlawful employment practices as
adverse job action because of individual's age).
214. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (describing how
Sherman Act plaintiff could prove jurisdictional element of effect on commerce); United
Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 955 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wood, D., J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he plaintiffs will have a right to recover if defendant's activities have the requisite
effect on either U.S. domestic or import commerce (and they can prove the remainder of their
federal antitrust claim) .....
215. See infra Part IV.B.
216. See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text. To the extent it would be unconstitutional for
Congress to regulate the conduct of an entity not engaged in interstate commerce, Congress
obviated that problem by expressly limiting the reach of the statute through the jurisdictional
element. It will not be possible for the statute, and thus federal substantive power, to be applied
beyond constitutional limits because the statute does not extend that far. Moreover, to the extent 
the
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Failure to distinguish judicial and legislative jurisdiction led a deeply
divided en banc Seventh Circuit astray in United Phosphorus Ltd. v.
Angus Chemical Co. 217 That case dealt with the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act (FTAIA) limitation of the Sherman Act in foreign-
commerce cases to restraints of trade having a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic trade or commerce, that is
trade or commerce other than solely with foreign nations. 18 The
legislative history showed that Congress adopted the FTAIA to reduce
the number of foreign antitrust cases brought in federal court. Working
from this history, the majority defined the statute as a measure stripping
federal courts of jurisdiction, making the key limiting provision--effect
on domestic interstate (rather than purely foreign) commerce-ajurisdictional fact going to the court's authority to decide the case.219
Judge Diane Wood responded in dissent that there was no "hint that the
Congress was attempting to strip jurisdiction"; rather "[1]anguage like
that of the FTAIA, stating that a law does not 'apply' in certain
circumstances, cannot be equated to language stating that the courts do
not have fundamental competence to consider defined categories of
cases. ' 22° Judge Wood demanded a clear textual statement from
Congress that a particular statute targeted the courts' jurisdiction;
finding none, she concluded that the requirement went to the contours of
the law and the limits of the plaintiff's substantive claim.22'
The language of the FTAIA suggests that Judge Wood was correct.
The statute expressly limits the real-world circumstances to which the
Sherman Act "shall apply," but says nothing about the jurisdiction of the
failure of a jurisdictional element means Congress could not constitutionally regulate the real-world
conduct at issue, it is a problem of Congress's substantive cause-of-action enacting power, not its
structural jurisdiction-granting power. See supra notes 149-64.
217. 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
218. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l)(A)-(B) (2000); United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 945-46.
219. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 951 ("[T]he legislative history shows that jurisdiction
stripping is what Congress had in mind in enacting FTAIA."); id. at 946-47 (tracing adoption ofFTAIA as congressional response to ongoing debate about extraterritorial reach of federal antitrustlaws); id. at 951 (relying on Supreme Court and lower court cases using jurisdictional terms to
describe affecting-commerce element in foreign antitrust claims).
220. Id. at 954-55 (Wood, D., J., dissenting).
221. See id. at 955 (Wood, D., J., dissenting) ("The fact that the FTAIA does not contain a clear
congressional statement that it is intended to restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts (or for that matter even a brief mention of the term 'jurisdiction') should be enough to resolve
the question before us."); infra Part V.
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federal courts.22 2 The FTAIA resulted in fewer antitrust cases in federal
court only because Congress made a prior, unrelated structural decision
to grant exclusive federal jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims.223
Limiting the reach of the act reduced the number of all possible antitrust
claims, which necessarily reduced the number of actions in the only
forum in which they could be brought. But that jurisdictional
consequence was incidental to a substantive limit on the range of actors
and conduct to which the Sherman Act applied. Where there is
concurrent state court jurisdiction over claims under a federal statute,
limiting the reach of that statute also will reduce the number of claims
brought in state court, showing that the limitation affects the substance
of the statutory claim, not just federal jurisdiction.224
Perhaps the FTAIA's additional requirement of an effect on domestic
interstate commerce does function as a statutory jurisdictional nexus, a
nod to substantive limits on the extraterritorial reach of congressional
power. But extraterritorial reach concerns congressional authority to
make substantive law applicable to primary conduct beyond United
States territory. Justice Scalia made the point most insistently:
[T]he extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act ... has nothing
to do with the jurisdiction of the courts. It is a question of
substantive law turning on whether, in enacting the Sherman
Act, Congress asserted regulatory power over the challenged
conduct.225
222. F. Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, -, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2365 (2004)
(stating that FTAIA excludes foreign cases from reach of Sherman Act, then creates exceptions to
that exclusion); id. at _ 124 S. Ct. at 2366 (addressing question implicitly as one going to
whether foreign plaintiffs stated claim on merits for antitrust violation). Hoffman-LaRoche
abrogates, at least implicitly, United Phosphorus; the Supreme Court (and the lower courts) applied
the FTAIA and spoke not in terms of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, but in terms of whether
plaintiffs residing in Ecuador could bring claims under federal law. See F. Hoffman-LaRoche, 542
U.S. at _, 124 S. Ct. at 2363; id. at - 124 S. Ct. at 2366 (concluding that "the Sherman Act does
not apply").
223. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379 (1985) ("[F]ederal
antitrust claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts."); Johnson v. Nyack
Hosp., 964 F.2d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[F]ederal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal
antitrust lawsuits.").
224. See supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
225. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. Policy Choices
If quantum of employees is not a jurisdictional element of federal
anti-discrimination laws, then it must reflect a simple congressional
policy choice to limit the laws' reach to employers of a certain size. The
limitation initially was grounded in a desire to keep the federal
government and federal law away from mom-and-pop operations in
small communities-businesses less able to bear the costs of compliance
with new federal obligations.226  One Senator argued that Congress
should avoid regulating the employee-employer relationship in small
businesses because that relationship was closer and more intimate, akin
to a businessman selecting a wife. 227 The limitation may have been part
of a larger legislative compromise to gamer support of western-state
Republicans and moderate Democrats, who did not necessarily oppose
anti-discrimination laws in principle (many western states had such
laws), but who did oppose increases in federal power.228
226. See Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 82 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he fifteen-employee
threshold appears motivated by policy-to spare small companies the expense of complying withTitle VII .... "); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In discussions over aproposed change to the minimum employee threshold, the burdens placed upon a small business
forced to comply with federal regulations and defend against a Title VI1 suit were explicitly
addressed."); see also, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 13092 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton) ("If we desire
violence, bitterness, and hatred among the races in this country, I suggest that we put the Federal
Government with a club into the livelihood of every small businessman .... "); id. ("Title VII is the
most dangerous part of it, because it would lead the Federal Government with all of its power,
majesty and bureaucracy into the way of dealing with a small businessman who can ill afford toprotect himself."); id. at 13088 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (supporting bill by noting that, with
twenty-five-employee size limit, 92% of employers nationwide "would not be touched by the
Federal statute."). But see id. at 13092 (statement of Sen. Morse) ("I know of no reason why we
should set small businessmen aside and say, 'You can continue discrimination with immunity.');
but cf Alfred W. Blumrosen, Introduction to Labor and Employment Law Symposium, II MISS. C.L. REV. 195, 195 (1991) ("The assumption that 'the employer' is a small business person strugglingin a 'mom and pop' environment is ... often so unrealistic as to distort the interpretation of the
law.").
227. 110 CONG. REC. 13085 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton); see also Jacqueline Louise
Williams, Comment, The Flimsy Yardstick How Many Employees Does it Take to Defeat a TitleVII Discrimination Claim?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 221, 233 n.41 (1996) ("The statement does not
reflect well on small businesses or wives.").
228. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OFPUBLIC POLICY 18 (3d ed. 2001) (describing need for support from conservative Republicans and
moderate Democrats from Western and border states for Civil Rights Act of 1964); id. at 21(describing arguments made to Senators from western states, many of which already had anti-discrimination laws, that federal legislation would have only incremental effect in their states);
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Of course, every statutory element reflects a discretionary substantive
policy choice by the enacting legislature as to the scope, reach, and
application of its enactment-a choice as to who can sue whom for what
conduct.229 Congress's decision not to reach businesses with fewer than
fifteen, twenty-five, or fifty employees reflects such a policy choice. But
so do its decisions not to extend Title VII protections to independent
contractors 23 or not to expand the prohibition on discrimination because
of race, sex, ethnicity, nationality, and religion to discrimination because
of sexual orientation.231
If every statutory element reflects legislative choice, there is no
justification for treating one choice (the limitation on who may be a
liable defendant) as jurisdictional while treating all other choices
(limitations on who will be protected from what conduct) as merits-
based. There is no basis for resolving different policy choices reflected
in a single statute at different phases of the litigation process. If the latter
factual elements are uniformly treated as going to the merits of the cause
of action and having nothing to do with subject-matter jurisdiction, so
should the former.
V. DETERMINING JURISDICTION UNDER POSITIVE LAW
The analytical cornerstone for separating jurisdiction and merits lies
in John Harrison's model of congressional power-the distinction
New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417,
1454 (2003) (stating that many Republicans opposed increasing role of federal government in
regulating private economic and social affairs); id. at 1472-73 (arguing that need to make bill more
palatable to pivotal moderate Republicans lead to amendments that would ameliorate impact of Title
VII on American business).
The policy grounding also may explain why different employment-discrimination statutes have
different quantum-of-employee thresholds. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (fifteen
employees in Title VII), and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000) (same in ADA), with 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611 (4)(A)(i) (2000) (fifty employees in FMLA).
229. See Harrison, supra note 17, at 2515.
230. See supra note 210.
231. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cit. 2001) ("Because the
evidence produced by [the plaintiff]-and indeed, his very claim-indicated only that he was being
harassed on the basis of his sexual orientation, rather than because of his sex, the District Court
properly determined that there was no cause of action under Title VII."). But see Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 197, 203 (1994) (arguing that stigmatization of gays functions as part of larger system of
social control based on gender).
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between Congress's substantive powers to create statutory causes of
action (to determine who can sue whom for what and for what remedy)
and its structural powers to grant, deny, or limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to hear and resolve those claims.232 The exercise of
distinct powers produces distinct statutory enactments (or at least
distinct provisions of the same statute233) that serve distinct functions.234
The legal and factual issues whose resolution control application of
distinct statutes are adjudicated in distinct phases and in a distinct
manner within the judicial process.235
Some lower courts have reserved the quantum-of-employee issue for
the trier of fact not because it is purely a merits fact, but on the view that
the definition of employer implicates both merits and jurisdiction.236 But,
at least as most jurisdictional statutes presently are drafted, there should
be no circumstances in which substantive factual issues overlap with or
implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.237
232. See Harrison, supra note 17, at 2513-14; see also Leonard, supra note 31, at 280.
233. A single statute often contains one provision creating the cause of action and a separate
provision granting federal jurisdiction over that cause of action. See William Cohen, The Broken
Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
890, 905-06 & n.65 (1967) (stating that Congress generally creates cause of action and
simultaneously provides special grant of jurisdiction and that most cases arise under these special
grants rather than § 1331 alone); Leonard, supra note 31, at 289. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1) (providing that "person aggrieved" may bring civil action for unlawful employment
practice), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (granting district courts jurisdiction "of actions brought
under" Title VII). This does not mean, however, that the same statutory provision creates both
jurisdiction and the cause of action. The Tenth Circuit erroneously concluded that the ADA both
grants jurisdiction and establishes the cause of action, thus justifying treating quantum of employees
as jurisdictional, see Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 2002).
In fact, there are two distinct provisions of the ADA serving distinct purposes and only one, the
substantive provision, involves a quantum-of-employees inquiry.
234. See supra notes 148-76 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part I.
236. See Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 927-28 (1 1th Cir. 2003); Trainor, 318 F.3d at
978 (holding that merits and jurisdiction are intertwined when same statute grants subject-matter
jurisdiction and provides substantive claim); Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256,
1264 (11 th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he question of whether or not a defendant is an 'employer' is a
substantive element of an ADEA claim and intertwined with the question of jurisdiction."). For a
discussion of cases in which courts have viewed jurisdiction and merits as intertwined, see Stefania
A. Di Trolio, Comment, Undermining and Unintwining: The Right to a Jury Trial and Rule
12(b)(1), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1247, 1259-71 (2003).
237. See Clermont, supra note 18, at 19 (arguing that jurisdictional statutes should avoid using
terms that connote merits-related legal outcome); Idleman, Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30,
at 323 (emphasizing importance of initial categorization of issue as either Article III jurisdictional
or as merits-related). Clermont points to one arguable exception: the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
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A federal court should look to the appropriate positive-law provision
at the appropriate phase of the litigation process. That means resolving
jurisdiction first, according to the jurisdiction-granting statutory
language, before even peeking at the factual specifics of the plaintiffs
federal cause of action.238 Having found jurisdiction, the court has
authority to entertain the case and to grant judgment on the merits in
favor of or against either party.239 The elements of the underlying
statutory claim then provide the exclusive focus of that merits analysis.
Statutes enacted via Congress's structural powers necessarily speak in
express jurisdictional terms of judicial power to entertain and consider a
defined category of cases.24° Most importantly, Congress granted federal
district courts "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.",241 It also granted
federal district courts original jurisdiction in specific classes of civil
actions, 242 such as those "brought under" the substantive provisions of
Title V11243  and "arising under any Act of Congress regulating
commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and
U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2679-2680 (2000), which grants district courts original jurisdiction over tort claims
in which a government employee committed the alleged tort while "acting within the scope of his
office or employment." Id. § 1346(b). Clermont suggests that the factual issue of action in scope of
employment overlaps with the ultimate merits question of whether the defendant in fact committed
the tortious act alleged. Clermont, supra note 18, at 21-22.
238. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998); Da Silva v. Kinsho
Int'l. Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing rule that any merits decisions made in
absence ofjurisdiction must be disregarded).
239. See Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 1216; Mishkin, supra note 18, at 166.
240. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 954 (7th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (Wood, D., J., dissenting) (emphasizing difference between Congress phrasing issue in terms
of scope or application of statute and Congress using jurisdictional language); id. at 954-55 (Wood,
D., J., dissenting) (arguing that statute is not jurisdictional grant when it does not speak in
jurisdictional terms or even mention jurisdiction); Idleman, Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note
30, at 324 n.366. The en bane Seventh Circuit majority in United Phosphorus recognized the
"purity" of this argument, but insisted, without explanation, that "nothing is quite that simple."
United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 950.
241. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
242. See Cohen, supra note 233, at 905-06 & n.65. But see Leonard, supra note 31, at 277
(arguing that § 1331 supplies jurisdictional basis for large number of federal statutory and
constitutional cases).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2000). That jurisdictional grant is incorporated by reference in
the modeled employment discrimination statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (ADA) (providing
that the "powers, remedies, and procedures" set forth in § 2000e-5 "shall be the powers, remedies,
and procedures" provided to any person alleging discrimination based on disability).
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monopolies. ' '244 As for constitutional claims under § 1983, Congress
granted district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person... to redress the
deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States. ' 245
These jurisdiction-granting statutes stand alone as the focus of
12(b)(1) analysis. The court must understand, interpret, and apply the
appropriate statutory jurisdictional grant to determine whether it has
jurisdiction-the basic power or authority to entertain, consider, and
resolve the legal and factual issues in the case.246
A. Defining "Arising Under"
In order to apply these jurisdictional statutes, courts must determine
the meaning of the statutory phrase "arising under., 247 Doctrine and
244. 28 U.S.C. § 1337; see United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 953 (Wood, D., J., dissenting)
(describing federal courts' "acknowledged subject matter jurisdiction" over FTAIA claim under
both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337).
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3); see Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, 816 F.2d 895, 898 (3d
Cir. 1987) (describing §§ 1331 and 1343 as statutes which actually vest federal courts with power
over constitutional claims).
One could argue this provides the closest example of a fact serving double duty between
jurisdiction and merits. Both the § 1983 cause of action and the § 1343(a)(3) jurisdictional grant
require a person acting "under color" of state law, making that a fact that must be resolved both to
find jurisdiction and to determine whether the defendant is liable on the merits. In fact, however, the
better reading of § 1343(a)(3) is as a more detailed way of granting federal jurisdiction "of any civil
action authorized. . . to be commenced by any person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and underlying
constitutional rights. Congress could have granted jurisdiction by cross-referencing the substantive
cause of action (as Title VII does in its jurisdictional grant, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)). Instead,
§ 1343(a)(3) grants jurisdiction by repeating much of the language of the substantive provision
(§ 1983) over which jurisdiction has been granted.
The effect is the same, however. Congress granted district courts original jurisdiction of civil
actions commenced to redress deprivations of constitutional or statutory rights brought pursuant to
the § 1983 cause of action. The under-color-of-law element is part of the cause of action only, not
the jurisdictional grant.
246. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
247. "Arising under" appears to have the same meaning as "brought under" and
"commenced.. . to redress a deprivation of." See EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 528 F. Supp. 610,
614-15 (D. Wis. 1981) (stating there is "no reason" to assign terms different meanings), rev'd on
other grounds, 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982); Charles R. Calleros, Reconciling the Goals of
Federalism with the Policy of Title VII Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Judicial Enforcement of
EEOC Conciliation Agreements, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 288-89 (1985). "Arising under" also has
a different meaning in Article III than it does in § 1331 or any of the other jurisdiction-granting
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commentary suggest several possible ways to define that term. When
applied to the federal statutory actions with which we are concerned, all
the possible definitions function the same, both linguistically and in
outcome.
Justice Holmes proffered the "most familiar ' 248 definition of "arising
under," arguing that a "suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action.,,2 49 For a case to arise under, federal law "must create at least a
part of the cause of action by its own force. 25 ° Paul Mishkin described
this as a requirement that the plaintiffs claim be "founded 'directly'
upon national law," meaning the plaintiff contends that a federally
ordained rule specifically creates her cause of action and establishes her
statutes. See REDISH, supra note 31, at 84; Cohen, supra note 233, at 891 ("[T]he statutory grant has
been conceded to vest in the federal courts less than the scope of federal question jurisdiction which
Congress might vest."); Donald L. Doemberg, There's No Reason for it; it's Just Our Policy: Why
the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 597, 598 (1987) ("Regrettably (at least from the standpoint of simplicity), the Court
has not interpreted the two provisions in the same manner .. "). The phrase in its constitutional
incarnation has been given a broad reading by the Court. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) ("We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial
power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in
the power of congress to give ... jurisdiction of that cause .. "); Mishkin, supra note 18, at 160
(arguing that Osborn "quite properly attributed a broad scope to that language"). But see Bellia,
supra note 155, at 854 ("We do better today when we read Osborn not as occupying the field of
federal question jurisdiction, but as defining a species of Article III federal question
jurisdiction .. "). Meanwhile, the phrase has been given a much narrower statutory scope. See
REDISH, supra note 31, at 96; Doernberg, supra, at 599; Mishkin, supra note 18, at 160. Our concern
is only with the meaning in present statutory contexts, rather than what it could mean if Congress
decided to exercise the full scope of its Article III structural powers in granting district courts
statutory federal question jurisdiction. See REDISH, supra note 31, at 95 ("But the fact that Congress
has power to vest jurisdiction does not mean that it has, in fact, exercised that power .... ).
248. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377 (2004); see also Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (stating that "vast majority" of cases brought
under § 1331 satisfy Justice Holmes's test); Cohen, supra note 233, at 897 (stating that Justice
Holmes sought to create an all-purpose test).
249. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916); Smith v. Kansas
City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A] suit cannot be said
to arise under any other law than that which creates the cause of action."); see also REDISH, supra
note 31, at 97 ("Holmes' reasoning has a certain practical appeal."); Doemberg, supra note 247, at
627.
250. Smith, 255 U.S. at 215 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v.
Darue Eng'g & Mfg., - U.S...., (June 13, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2366 (2005) (stating that
§ 1331 "is invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law"); see
also Bellia, supra note 155, at 854 (describing "federal question jurisdiction ... in which federal
law creates the right to relief').
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substantive right to a remedy for a violation of that rule.251 And the
Supreme Court recently refined the definition to look to whether the
plaintiffs claim against the defendant was "made possible" by an
applicable federal statute.252 Although derived from a slightly different
context, 253 this refined test translates to jurisdictional statutes, focusing
on whether the plaintiff seeks relief under a substantive federal statute
that "creates a . . . right to maintain an action. 254
In Gully v. First National Bank,255 Justice Cardozo suggested a
second, seemingly related standard for "arising under":
To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by
the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element,
and an essential one, of the plaintiffs cause of action .... The
right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the
Constitution or laws of the United States are given one
construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another.256
From these related approaches, particularly the second part of Justice
Cardozo's, several commentators have fashioned an "outcome-
determinative test," that looks to whether there are present in the action
federal issues "whose decision one way will necessarily cause a result in
the case, and whose decision the other way will tend to prevent it" or to
bring about a different result.257 The inquiry focuses on whether the
251. Mishkin, supra note 18, at 165; see also Cohen, supra note 233, at 896.
252. Jones, 541 U.S. at 382.
253. Jones dealt with the federal catch-all four-year statute of limitations for "'civil action[s]
arising under an Act of Congress enacted after' December 1, 1990." Id. at 375 (citations omitted);
28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000). The Court rejected the argument that "arising under" necessarily means
the same thing in § 1658 as in jurisdictional grants such as §§ 1331 or 1337 simply because all are
codified in Title 28 of the United States Code. See Jones, 541 U.S. at 376 ("We hesitate to place too
much significance on the location of a statute in the United States Code."). Nevertheless, the use of
the phrase in one structural statute is a good guide for its use in another.
254. Jones, 541 U.S. at 382.
255. 299 U.S. 106 (1936).
256. Id. at 112; see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946) (holding that § 1331 is satisfied
where "the right of the petitioners to recover under the complaint will be sustained if the
Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction and will be defeated if they
are given another"); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900) ("'The suit must, in
part at least, arise out of a controversy between the parties in regard to the operation and effect of
the Constitution or laws upon the facts involved."' (quoting Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes,
96 U.S. 199, 203 (1877))); see also REDISH, supra note 31, at 105 ("Gully probably continues to be
valid as a principle of exclusion."); Doemberg, supra note 247, at 656 (arguing that Justice
Cardozo's approach "is sound and should be retained").
257. Doernberg, supra note 247, at 656-57.
Jurisdiction and Merits
outcome will turn on construction of federal law. 258 As Justice Scalia
framed it, a claim arises under federal law where the plaintiff wins under
one conceivable construction of a federal statute or Constitution and
loses under another.259  The plaintiff establishes jurisdiction by
demonstrating the existence of a "dispute based upon federal law that
can, if adjudicated, determine the outcome of the case.,
260
Finally, a federal district court's original jurisdiction may be based
solely on issues of fact and statutory application. A court has jurisdiction
when the plaintiff contends that the defendant's real-world conduct
ignored or violated requirements or obligations established in federal
constitutional or statutory -law, causing some injury.261 Resolution of
issues of fact is central to the vindication of the federal right, and thus to
district courts' role as vindicators of federal rights.262 Mishkin argued
that "the general federal question statute would seem to include within it
cases in which the interpretation of national law is clear and only the
facts alleged to give rise to a federal right are in dispute. 263 A federal
court therefore has authority to oversee resolution where the only triable
issue between the parties is whether, in the real world, this defendant is
an employer, this plaintiff is an employee who suffered adverse
employment action, and this defendant acted on an impermissible
motive-even when the statutory meanings of those terms are
undisputed.
Applying any of these definitions can be difficult at the margins, as
when a state law cause of action incorporates federal law as an
element. 264 But claims under Title VII, § 1983, or the Sherman Act are
258. REDISH, supra note 31, at 105 ("[F]ederal question jurisdiction should be found if the
outcome of the case may turn on construction of federal law.").
259. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
260. Doemberg, supra note 247, at 656.
261. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) ("[T]he court must assume jurisdiction to decide
whether the allegations state a cause of action on which the court can grant relief as well as to
determine issues of fact arising in the controversy.").
262. See Mishkin, supra note 18, at 170; see also Cohen, supra note 233, at 892-93.
263. Mishkin, supra note 18, at 169; see Cohen, supra note 233, at 892 ("It is not anomalous that
federal courts should exercise jurisdiction to enforce federal rights in cases where only issues of fact
are put in issue.").
264. See Cohen, supra note 233, at 898 (arguing that different tests for arising under break down
by failing to "supply an analytical definition which will determine whether plaintiff's claim is a
federal cause of action incorporating state law, or a state cause of action incorporating federal law");
see, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., - U.S. -, - (June 13,
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not at the margins. They squarely involve purely federal causes of action
over which Congress intended to grant federal jurisdiction.265 The
plaintiffs claim is founded directly on a particular federal statute that
makes some conduct unlawful. The plaintiff's action and the remedy she
seeks are "made possible" because Congress created the statutory cause
of action and established the plaintiff's right to hale an appropriate
defendant into court to recover for a violation of these federal rights.
Interpretation or application of these elements to the real-world actors,
facts, and circumstances in one direction yields one outcome and one
winner; an interpretation or application in a different direction yields a
different outcome and a different winner.
The plaintiffs allegations that the defendant's conduct ignored or
violated obligations imposed by federally created law (constitutional or
statutory) establish federal jurisdiction. The only jurisdictional issue is
whether the action involves some dispute over the meaning or
application of federally created law whose determination affects the
outcome. Specific questions of how broad or narrow federal law is, how
that law applies to the parties, conduct, and events at issue, and what
facts the plaintiff must prove to be entitled to relief play no part in the
jurisdictional inquiry.266
Instead, those facts go solely to the merits of the substantive federal
claim. The court possesses authority to resolve those merits and to enter
judgment on those merits in favor of either party.267 That the claim does
2005), 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2367-68 (2005) (describing analysis of federal jurisdiction where federal
issues are "embedded" in state law claims); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
809-10 (1986) (describing problem of defining jurisdiction where there is federal issue within state
cause of action); Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1934) (finding no
statutory "arising under" jurisdiction where federal law defined duty owed under state common
law); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 508 (1900) (stating that determination by
Congress that right of possession was to be decided by local customs did not involve question under
Constitution or laws of United States, but only determination of local rules and customs and state
statutes); see also REDISH, supra note 31, at 97-100 (tracing Supreme Court cases in which state law
and federal law elements mixed); Cohen, supra note 233, at 906-09 (same); Doernberg, supra note
247, at 626-40 (same).
265. See Cohen, supra note 233, at 905-06 ("The bulk of federal civil litigation in the federal
courts presents no jurisdictional problem.").
266. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 955 (7th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (Wood, D., J., dissenting) ("It is up to Congress to decide how broad or narrow a law it is
enacting, and what the plaintiff must prove to be entitled to relief."); Da Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp.,
229 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that plaintiff's ultimate failure to prove defendant's status
under law is grounds for defeating her claim on merits).
267. See Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 1216 (arguing that party who clears jurisdictional hurdle
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not ultimately succeed (or even that it does not get past pleading or
summary judgment because there are no material factual issues to try
before a fact-finder) means only that the plaintiff has failed to establish a
violation of her federal rights; it does not defeat federal jurisdiction.268
B. Limited Jurisdictional Facts Doctrine
Courts should understand that under no circumstances will a factual
issue enumerated in a substantive federal cause of action implicate
judicial jurisdiction. But one reason that courts appear so ready to
convert substantive merits facts into jurisdictional facts and to resolve
disputes at the 12(b)(1) phase is that jurisdiction frequently turns on
questions of discrete real-world historical fact that parties must allege
and prove separately and which the court is empowered to find and
resolve in measuring its jurisdiction.269 Courts have become accustomed
to jurisdictional fact-finding.
In fact, however, the "jurisdictional facts doctrine" is quite narrow,
confined largely to party-based, as opposed to subject-matter-based,
grants of federal jurisdiction.270  For example, district courts have
original jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different
states.27' Jurisdictional analysis requires courts to make findings
finds court clothed with entire power to do justice according to law or equity); Mishkin, supra note
18, at 166 (arguing that court with jurisdiction has power to enter judgment on merits for defendant
as well as plaintiff).
268. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) ("Jurisdiction ... is not defeated.. . by the
possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which [plaintiffs] could
actually recover."); Hartnett, supra note 121, at 2252 n.64 ("If a plaintiff fails to state a cause of
action (or, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim upon which relief can be granted),
the dismissal is on the merits, not for lack of jurisdiction."); Mishkin, supra note 18, at 166 ("The
power of the court to hear and decide a case could hardly be made to depend upon the jury's
verdict.").
269. See Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[W]hen jurisdiction
turns on whether a particular fact is true as here.., a court may inquire into the jurisdictional facts
without viewing the evidence in a light favorable to either party."); Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323
F.3d 920, 925 (1 1th Cir. 2003) ("[W]hen a defendant properly challenges subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1) the district court is free to independently weigh facts, and ' .. . there is
substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the
existence of its power to hear the case."' (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (1 1th
Cir. 1990))); Clermont, supra note 18, at 13-14 & n.38 (stating that judge decides jurisdictional
facts, which are classified as questions of law and not subject to jury resolution).
270. See Hartnett, supra note 121, at 2250 n.57 (noting that some heads of federal jurisdiction are
defined by legal subject and some are defined by party status).
271. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2000). The statute also requires that the amount in controversy
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regarding the nature and identity of the parties: where each party is
domiciled,272 whether all plaintiffs are diverse from all defendants,273
and which corporate facilities count as the corporation's principal place
of business.274
Jurisdictional facts also are central to so-called "protective-partyjurisdiction," where Congress grants federal jurisdiction over cases
based solely on an overriding national interest grounded in the nature,
identity, or status of one of the parties to the case, even where
substantive principles controlling the case derive from a source other
than federal law. 275 Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,276 for
example, federal jurisdiction turns on the fact question of whether the
defendant is a foreign state.277 Similarly, the Alien Tort Statute grants
district courts jurisdiction "of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States,, 278 the relevant jurisdictional fact being whether the plaintiff is,
exceed $75,000. Id.
272. Domicile is a classically fact-based concept, turning on a party's residence and intent to
make a particular state her permanent residence, to which she will return. See Mas v. Perry, 489
F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974).
273. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (interpreting § 1332 to require
complete diversity of citizenship between all adverse parties).
274. See United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Corp., 322 F.3d 942, 957 (7th Cir. 2003) (enbanc) (Wood, D., J., dissenting) ("Inquiries into diversity jurisdiction are often just as
straightforward, even though fact-finding might be necessary in the occasional case in which it is
unclear where a person is domiciled, or what amount is in controversy, or which of several
corporate facilities should count as the corporation's principal place of business."); see also 28U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (providing that corporation is citizen of its state of incorporation and state of its
principal place of business).
275. See REDISH, supra note 31, at 90-91; Mishkin, supra note 18, at 184-86. But see Mesa v.California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) ("We have, in the past, not found the need to adopt a theory of
'protective jurisdiction' to support Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction ... and we do not see any
need for doing so here .. "); Verlinden, BNV. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 491 n.17 (1983)(avoiding consideration of existence of protective-party jurisdiction because allowance of actions
under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act fell within Article III "arising under" jurisdiction); cfLouise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV.731, 804 (arguing that concept of statutory protective-party jurisdiction as exercise of constitutional
"'arising under" jurisdiction means that statutory diversity jurisdiction also is product of
constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction).
276. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
277. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493-94. The grant creates several exemptions from immunity,
such as where the civil action is based upon commercial activity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000),
and where the action is based upon acts of torture or terrorism. See id. § 1605(a)(7).
278. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, -, 124 S. Ct.
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in fact, an alien.
These party-based jurisdictional statutes are grounded on issues of
fact unrelated to the merits of the claims or the equities of the
circumstances giving rise to the action, issues of fact subject to
resolution by the court. The jurisdictional facts-party domicile, the
defendant's status as a sovereign, or the plaintiff's status as an alien-
have nothing to do with the underlying tort or contract claim.279
In contrast, the "arising under" (or "brought under" or "commenced
to redress a deprivation of") jurisdictional grants do not ask historical
factual questions. 280 They ask only for a prediction from the court: Does
it appear (based solely on the pleadings 281) that the plaintiff seeks relief
created or made possible by a federal enactment? Does it appear that the
outcome of the dispute between the parties will turn on an interpretation,
construction, or application of the federal Constitution or federal statute
to some set of factual circumstances? 282  If the court predicts an
affirmative answer to those questions, it has jurisdiction.
Kevin Clermont argues that the plaintiff must make at least a prima
facie showing to establish that her civil action arises under federal
law.283 The prediction I propose involves even less rigorous inquiry. A
court applying an "arising under" jurisdictional grant should look no
further-indeed may look no further-than the four comers of the
pleadings to discern the origin of the plaintiffs cause of action, with no
consideration of the potential or ultimate legal or factual validity of that
284
cause of action.
2739, 2755 (2004) (defining statute as jurisdictional); Dodge, supra note 168, at 98; supra notes
166-70 and accompanying text.
279. Lee, supra note 4, at 1626 ("[T]here is obviously a difference between asking whether all
plaintiffs are diverse from all defendants and asking whether the defendant was negligent.").
280. See Mishkin, supra note 18, at 164 (describing use of special jurisdictional allegations in
diversity cases but lack of such allegations in federal question cases).
281. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (holding that § 1331
is satisfied "only when the plaintiffs statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based
upon those laws or that Constitution."); Doemberg, supra note 247, at 599 ("[F]ederal question
jurisdiction does not exist unless the federal question appears in the 'right' place, that is, the
plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint.").
282. See supra notes 246-68 and accompanying text.
283. Clermont, supra note 18, at 19.
284. In Bell v. Hood, the Supreme Court suggested that a federal claim could be dismissed for
want of subject-matter jurisdiction if it is "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." See 327 U.S. 678,
682-83 (1946); Clermont, supra note 18, at 22-23 (describing this as requirement that claim be
"sufficiently meritorious," usually established unless federal claim is "laughably weak"). This
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This leaves us with the final problem of identifying when facts
enumerated in particular federal statutes are jurisdictional and when they
are substantive. That line can be drawn by modifying Lea Brilmayer's
concept of "substantive relevance. 285  The question is whether a
particular fact must be pled and proven in order for the plaintiff to
prevail in the identical civil action claiming a violation of the identical
federal statute brought in state court, where federal subject-matterjurisdiction is not in issue.286 If a fact would still be relevant because the
applicable substantive federal law makes it meaningful to the outcome of
the legal treatment of the dispute, the fact has substantive relevance to
the cause of action and therefore goes to the merits in state court.287 As
such, it also goes to the merits in federal court and has nothing to do
with federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
For example, party domicile will not be relevant in a state-law
negligence action in state court. Domicile therefore would be a purely
jurisdictional fact for purposes of the same negligence claim in federal
court on diversity. Conversely, the plaintiff in a § 1983 action must
inquiry, however limited, still goes beyond the prediction I suggest is appropriate for determining
whether a claim is brought under substantive federal law.
Even the limited merits review suggested by Bell is too much because it essentially incorporates a
12(b)(6) (i.e., merits) standard into the jurisdictional analysis. See REDISH, supra note 31, at 106
n.152; Idleman, Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 294. Bell unavoidably, and
impermissibly, morphs into a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the claim in the guise of ajurisdictional inquiry. See Idleman, Hypothetical Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 290 (describing Bell
doctrine as "curious"). To the extent Bell complicates analysis of "arising under" jurisdictional
grants, its vitality and logic as a jurisdictional doctrine is questionable. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528, 538 (1974); REDISH, supra note 31, at 106 n.152. In any event, Bell does not empower
courts to find disputed facts (such as quantum of employees) in making a jurisdictional decision.
285. Brilmayer, Due Process, supra note 22, at 82. Brilmayer developed this concept in the
personal jurisdiction context. She argued that the difference between specific personal jurisdiction(where contacts between a defendant and the forum state are related to or give rise to the
controversy) and general personal jurisdiction (where the contacts are not related) turns on whether
the contact is the "geographical qualification of a fact relevant to the merits." Id. The question is
whether the particular fact of a defendant contact with the forum ordinarily would be alleged as part
of a comparable complaint in a purely intrastate dispute (where the reach of the court's in personamjurisdiction is not in issue); if it would be alleged, the contact with the forum is related to the
controversy. Id.
286. See Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1444,
1455 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Related Contacts] (arguing that applicable rules of law must
make fact in question substantively relevant); cf Di Trolio, supra note 236, at 1280 (suggesting
similar approach to deciding whether jurisdictional fact intertwines with merits).
287. See Brilmayer, Due Process, supra note 22, at 82-83; Brilmayer, Related Contacts, supra
note 286, at 1456.
Jurisdiction and Merits
plead and prove that the defendant acted under color of state law
whether she brings her constitutional claim in federal or state court. State
action therefore is a substantive merits fact in all § 1983 actions, no
matter where brought. A dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
in federal court never should be based on a court's finding as to action
under color of law that could preclude the plaintiff from proving her
claim in state court.288
CONCLUSION
To end the discussion where we began, return to the core example. A
Title VII plaintiff always must plead and prove that the defendant is an
employer within the meaning of Title VII; that is, a person with fifteen
or more employees engaged in an industry affecting commerce subject
to the restrictions of the law. That fact has "substantive relevance" in
Brilmayer's sense and goes to the merits of the claim. If the defendant is
an employer, the plaintiff may be able to prevail (assuming satisfaction
of the other, indisputably merits-based factual elementsE
8 9). If the
defendant is not an employer, the plaintiff cannot prevail in any court.
In measuring its subject-matter jurisdiction at the first phase of the
process, the federal district court need not-indeed should not--even
consider the defendant's status as an employer. The court's only concern
is that the action arises under or is brought under Title VII. That is, the
plaintiffs claim is made possible by-and seeks to remedy a real-world
deprivation of-Title VII, a federally created provision whose
interpretation and application to real-world facts (whatever they turn out
to be) will determine the outcome and winner of the case.29°
The federal court has jurisdiction (the basic power or authority to
entertain, consider, and resolve the issues) to resolve this action,
according to the formal procedural strictures of the litigation framework.
As an always-substantive merits fact, quantum of employees can be
adjudicated at the second phase of the process only if it is undisputed or
if relevant evidence all points toward a showing that the defendant is not
an employer. To the extent the fact is in issue, it can be resolved only at
288. This approach avoids the preclusion problem that comes with double-counting particular
facts. See supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 79-83, 208-16 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 247-68 and accompanying text.
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the final phase of civil litigation of a full trial on the merits before a
finder of fact.291
291. See Marcus, Fact Pleading, supra note 38, at 440.
